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Abstract 
The study aimed to address the phenomenon of states’ participation in the UN Peacekeeping 
Operation (UNPKO), by analysing the motivations behind a state’s increased participation in 
UNPKO. The phenomenon was approached multi-dimensionally by applying a comprehensive 
theoretical model of Bellamy and Williams (2013), which introduced five rationales that 
influence state’s participation in UNPKO. Indonesia was selected as a typical case because of 
its characteristics and behaviour of significantly increasing the participation since 2004. Data 
collection process consisted of interviews with relevant officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and Defence Ministry and analysis of high-level speeches, legal documents, and news 
articles. After the data was gathered, the study applied the model of Bellamy and Williams to 
interpret the findings; and an analysis using middle power theory was performed to further the 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
The result showed that state deploys its personnel to UNPKO when it is perceived as beneficial 
to further its interests and ideology. State deploys its personnel to UNPKO in order to further 
its foreign policy goals (increase its national prestige and accelerate its role in international 
cooperation so that its voice can be heard), to further its interest to contain conflicts not to 
spread from their roots, to gain military advantages (international military experience, increase 
interoperability, legitimize the armed force), and to further its ideology of being a supportive 
humanitarian state. The study argued that state does not participate simply for financial 
advantage, because the result found that state would still participate even though it does not 
gain significant benefit economically (on the contrary, state is burdened by training and standby 
costs).  
This behaviour is in line with the characteristics of middle powers, in which middle powers 
perceives prestige and positive image as important and tend to get involved in the maintenance 
of peace and security for humanitarian purposes. Therefore, the study concluded that the status 
as middle power influences state to participate more in UNPKO. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
“UN Peacekeeping is an investment in global peace, 
security, and prosperity. The Blue Helmets are a 
concrete expression of the Charter’s determination 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war.” 
Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General1 
 
eacekeeping is necessary for positive conflict transformation, according to many 
conflict resolution theorists (Woodhouse, 2015: 27), and the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) is the key instrument in maintaining world peace 
and order (Hutabarat, 2014: 184). By the end of March 2018,2 there are 14 active UN (United 
Nations) peacekeeping missions in the world.3 The UN openly ‘calls upon’ its member states 
to take part in maintaining international peace and security by contributing to UNPKO 
according to the Article 43(1) of the UN Charter (Moelle, 2017: 25).  
There are two ways for the UN member states to contribute to UNPKO: financially and 
personnel-wise (participation). Financial contribution is binding for all UN member states, and 
each state pays differently according to the UN General Assembly’s scale of assessment 
(Global Policy Forum, 2017). On the other hand, personnel contribution is voluntary. This type 
of contribution is usually referred to as “troops contribution” even though there are various 
types of personnel, not just troops (there are police and civilians personnel as well). As of 31 
March 2018, 124 out of 193 UN member states contribute troops to UNPKO.4 It is worth to 
note that the states which contribute the most to UNPKO in terms of troops are not neutral 
states which are known for conflict management strategy, but rather developing states, mostly 
from Asia and Africa (Ramsbotham, 2011: 136).  
                                                          
1 On his remarks to the Security Council Thematic Debate: “Peacekeeping Operations Review”. 
2 The timeframe period of this study is 2004-March 2018, therefore, the most recent data and information 
used are as of 31 March 2018. 
3 Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data.   
4 Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_ranking.pdf.  
P 
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A troop-contributing state that is interesting to observe is Indonesia, because it suddenly 
increased its participation in UNPKO since 2004. Indonesia is not a new player, as it has been 
contributing to UNPKO since 1957 when it deployed its troops to the UN Emergency Force 
(UNEF) in Egypt (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2015). However, the number of its personnel 
contribution was always ‘humble’. This ‘humble’ personnel contribution of Indonesia was 
increased in 2004, when Indonesia sent 188 troops to the UN Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Hutabarat, 2014: 187). This number might 
seem small in comparison to the contribution of the top-ten contributing states at that time; 
however, this is a historical point for Indonesia and it marks the continuous increase of 
Indonesia’s personnel contribution in UNPKO. Since then, Indonesia keeps growing the 
number of its personnel deployment in UNPKO. Also, in recent years, Indonesia began to 
openly state its personnel contribution to UNPKO as one of its foreign policy priority. By the 
end of March 2018, Indonesia has deployed 2,695 troops in nine missions, which positions 
itself in rank 8 out of 124 troop-contributing states.5  
The motivation behind personnel contribution6 of a state, like Indonesia, is appealing to 
analyse, because why would a state deploy its armed force and other personnel, even at some 
point significantly increase that deployment, to deal with someone else’s conflict? Why bother 
spending more money to deploy your nationals and risking their lives?  
 
I. 1. The Research Question and Its Relevance 
This phenomenon leads to a research question of What motivates state’s decision to increase 
its participation in UNPKO? This research uses a case study of Indonesia to answer that 
question. Therefore, the research question is refined into What has been motivating Indonesia’s 
decision to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004? It is an explanatory (retrospective) 
question, as it tries to explain a real-life phenomenon and reveal causal mechanisms. The 
research focuses on the period of post-2004 because the initial spark to participate more 
significantly in UNPKO has begun in 2004 for Indonesia. As the phenomenon is still going on 
and the number of troops deployed keeps changing (mostly growing), this research only limits 
its period of time to the most recent possible (31 March 2018). 
                                                          
5 Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/3_country_and_mission_1.pdf.   
6 later simply referred to as ‘participation’, to avoid confusion with ‘financial contribution’. 
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The argument proposed is that Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO is 
influenced by its status as a middle power, and that the most dominant reasons are mainly 
political and economic. Politically, Indonesia uses its participation in UNPKO as an instrument 
to further its other foreign policy goals. Economically, Indonesia enjoys the benefit of gaining 
incentives from the UN by participating, which is financially advantageous in national, 
institutional and individual level. 
As a case study, this research is directly relevant to Indonesian policymakers. The findings 
offer an objective academic perspective reflecting on current foreign policy, which can be 
utilized by policymakers to refine their policy and formulate relevant policies in the future.           
The analysis on Indonesia’s motivation to shift its policy regarding UNPKO can also be 
important for its neighbours as well as other states that need to negotiate with Indonesia. 
Moreover, at certain points, a comprehensive understanding of states’ motivation to participate 
is also contributive to the UN, in terms of monitoring and evaluation on states’ participations 
in UNPKO.  
Academically, this research contributes in answering why certain states decide to participate 
more to peacekeeping activities in general, and UNPKO specifically, by addressing the 
phenomenon multidimensionally. There are several researches I encountered on this topic, 
mostly case studies. Some address the phenomenon as a one-dimensional problem, while some 
other focus on certain dimensions but not comprehensively cover more comprehensive 
dimensions necessary (namely political, economic, security, civil-military relations, and 
ideological dimensions). Understanding this gap, this research utilized the most recent, more 
inclusive model of Bellamy and Williams (2013) in analysing the phenomenon and offers a 
more comprehensive answer to the research question by applying the model into the case study.  
The decision to choose Indonesia as the object of analysis is optimal because there are only a 
few researches that specifically focus on Indonesia. Furthermore, what makes this research 
more robust than the previous ones is that it takes into account an important thing that is missing 
in previous researches, which is Indonesia’s status as a middle power and how it can affect its 
participation in UNPKO. The results of the study are also applicable at some points for 
analysing the motivations of other participating states, as Indonesia possesses several features 
which might exist as well in other participating states, especially those which are also middle 
powers.  
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I. 2. The Research Procedure and Findings 
This research uses a qualitative approach; and the interpretative and explanatory case study is 
the most feasible research design to be applied, as it is close to real-life situation and helps to 
develop a nuanced view of reality. This research is a within-case study which aims to identify 
causal relationship between variables and utilizes congruence method as the methodology.  
The data is gathered mainly by performing semi-structured, elite interviews with open-ended 
questions to relevant government officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry and 
Indonesian Defence Ministry, as well as by analysing some reliable written sources. After the 
data is gathered, Bellamy and Williams’ model is applied. A comprehensive check and 
explanation is performed in seeing how the model explains the phenomenon and which 
Bellamy and Williams’ rationales fit Indonesia better than the others. After that, an analytical 
discussion provides further understanding on explaining why Indonesia ends up with the 
decision to increase its participation in UNPKO, by taking into account the theory of middle 
power behaviour. 
The study later found that Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO since 
2004 is mostly driven by political and institutional motives. Politically, Indonesia perceives its 
participation as an effective instrument to further several foreign policy goals, namely to 
increase its national prestige, leverage and voice in the UN. Institutionally, the participation is 
perceived as militarily beneficial to give Indonesia’s personnel an international experience, and 
to give Indonesia an opportunity to increase its military interoperability and legitimizing its 
military.  
Besides, Indonesia’s motivations to contain conflicts and to further its ideology to be a good 
humanitarian state are also present. It is also found that even though the deployment is not 
proven as financially beneficial (which means that the initial argument about economic motive 
is not supported), Indonesia still decided to increase the participation in UNPKO, because the 
political benefits gained from participating is far more invaluable than the financial costs 
Indonesia must face to participate. This reasoning of Indonesia reflects a behaviour of middle 
powers. Middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the 
participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their role in international 
politics.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
he chapter aims to provide discussion on relevant previous literature and how this 
case study can contribute by reflecting on the literature. However, sufficient 
background information is needed in order to be able to view the phenomenon of 
states’ participation in UNPKO comprehensively. Therefore, before discussing the relevant 
literature, a subchapter is presented to provide the background information. This chapter then 
consists of two main subchapters: the one that provides background information on the topic 
and the one that discusses literature on why states choose to participate in UNPKO. 
 
II. 1. Background Information on the Topic 
The subchapter provides background information on UNPKO and the mechanism of financial 
and troops contribution. It also elaborates background information on Indonesia, including its 
main characteristics and history of its participation in UNPKO.  
 
II. 1. 1. Overview on UNPKO 
There is no direct legal basis for the deployment of UNPKO. However, there is a legal 
framework inside Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter that can be used for UNPKO 
deployment, that is for the UN to take action towards ‘threats to peace’ and acts of aggression. 
This notion of ‘threat to peace’ is always used as the foundation for the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) in giving mandate to UN peacekeeping missions (Moelle, 2017: 25-26). Furthermore, 
as the UN is not reinforced by its own army, it openly ‘calls upon’ its member states to 
voluntarily deploy their personnel under the UN blue helmet as an act of taking part in 
maintaining international peace and security. As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, it is 
legally based on the Article 43(1) of the UN Charter. 
The traditional and essential purpose of UN peacekeeping is to “contain violence and prevent 
it from escalating to war; to limit the intensity, geographical spread and duration of war once 
it has broken out; and to consolidate a ceasefire and create space for reconstruction after the 
T 
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end of a war” (Ramsbotham, 2011: 133). It is also important to note that a peacekeeping 
mission can only be deployed when there is a consent from the host state (Moelle, 2017: 26).  
Over the years, UNPKO has developed and evolved, not only in terms of number but also in 
terms of mandate and purpose. This development is caused by the shifting in the nature of the 
conflicts itself (in which peacekeeping used to deal with inter-states conflict, but now it has 
evolved into dealing with intra-state conflicts, such as armed conflict with rebel or separatism 
group) and by the experiences the UNSC has learned in the past operations. In terms of mandate 
and purpose, its traditional purpose has now expanded. Not only focuses in security mandate, 
it now holds humanitarian and political objectives as well. This expansion impacts the 
composition of personnel deployed in the UNPKO, in which now it is more diverse as it 
consists of not only military but also civilian police and diplomatic personnel (Ramsbotham, 
2011: 136). In other words, the classic peacekeeping mandate is now evolving into 
“multifaceted operations” which includes not only military but also civil components with a 
wider mandate (Moelle, 2017: 7).  
In terms of quantity, the number of operations grew rapidly, particularly after the end of the 
Cold War. Since 1945, there have been 71 operations in total; and forty-eight of them take 
place in between 1991-now. This escalation, of course, goes hand in hand with the increasing 
number of troops deployed. The graphic below illustrates the trend on how the number of 
UNPKO personnel tends to relatively increase in the last 20 years (within 5 years gap 
observation). 
 
 
 
Figure II.1. The trend of the number of UNPKO personnel deployment 
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As mentioned earlier, there are two ways for the UN member states to contribute to the 
UNPKO: financially and participation-wise. Standing under Article 17 of the UN Charter as 
its legal umbrella, financial contribution to peacekeeping missions is a collective responsibility 
of all UN member states. The amount of financial contribution is different from one state to 
another, because it is based on the scale of assessment which has been agreed by all member 
states under the UN General Assembly meetings. As for the five permanent members of the 
UNSC, they are obliged to “pay a larger share” because they have extra responsibility in 
maintaining international peace and security. By the end of March 2018, the top-ten financial 
contributors are (in ranking order) USA, China, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Russia, Italy, 
Canada and Spain (Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 2018). 
The UN peacekeeping annual budgeting cycle is the period of 1 July - 30 June. For the last 
cycle, 1 July 2017 - 30 June 2018, UNPKO has the approved budget of US$6.8 billion. It is 
less than 0.5% of world military expenditure, which is estimated as US$1,747 billion 
(Department of Peacekeeping Operation, 2018). The budget amount is different from cycle to 
cycle, and it can increase or decrease based on economic growth of member states (on which 
the scale of assessment is updated). Each peacekeeping operation is given the budget based on 
its mandate (how much budget it needs to achieve its objectives). The budget is used for 
financing the operational costs, including paying the compensation incentives (see the next 
paragraph) to those states which deploy their personnel in UNPKO. 
The second type of contribution is personnel contribution (or simply referred to as 
‘participation’), which is the focus of this study. Different from financial contribution, this one 
is voluntary, even for the permanent members of the UNSC (the P-5). As the UN does not have 
military forces, it invites member states to participate in UNPKO by deploying their personnel. 
It provides an individual compensation incentive of US$1,410 per personnel per month. 
Furthermore, the UN gives incentive for those states that provide military equipment to the 
operations. All of the administrative agreements (including logistics and financial incentives) 
between the UN and a contributing state is legally written under a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU). Each deployment has one MoU.  
Per 31 March 2018, there are 14 active UN peacekeeping operations which consist of 91,058 
personnel from 124 contributing states.7 The top-ten participating states as of the end of March 
2018 are (in ranking order) Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Rwanda, Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt, 
                                                          
7 Data taken from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-0  
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Indonesia, Tanzania and Ghana. The detail information on the current operations can be 
observed in the following table. 
Mission Location and Starting Year 
Number of 
Personnel 
Biggest Troop Contributor 
MINUJUSTH Haiti, 2017 1,117 India 
MINURSO Western Sahara, 1991 470 Bangladesh 
MINUSCA Central African Republic, 2014 14,094 Pakistan 
MINUSMA Mali, 2013 15,156 Pakistan 
MONUSCO D.R. of the Congo, 2010 20,654 Pakistan 
UNAMID Darfur, 2007 15,321 Ethiopia 
UNDOF Golan, 1974 1,144 Nepal 
UNFICYP Cyprus, 1964 1,013 United Kingdom 
UNIFIL Lebanon, 1978 11,297 Indonesia 
UNISFA Abyei, 2011 4,765 Ethiopia 
UNMIK Kosovo, 1999 355 Czech Republic 
UNMISS South Sudan, 2011 17,965 Rwanda 
UNMOGIP India and Pakistan, 1949 113 Croatia 
UNTSO Middle East, 1948 374 Finland 
Table II.1. Current UN peacekeeping operations (as of 31 March 2018)8 
 
II. 1. 2. Overview on Indonesia 
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world with more than 17,000 islands. With the 
population of more than 245 million people (which consists of more than 300 ethnic groups), 
it is the fourth most populous state on earth. Furthermore, even though Indonesia is a state with 
the biggest Muslim population in the world, it is not an Islamic state. The government 
recognizes six religions/beliefs, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism. This fact on geographic and ethnic-social conditions of 
Indonesia is important to mention here because it makes this state conflict-prone (mostly 
between ethnic groups and religious groups) and challenging to manage. It has experienced a 
number of internal armed conflicts in the past, which makes Indonesia a proper example in 
conflict management and solution.  
                                                          
8 Data compiled from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.  
13 
 
It is also worth mentioning that Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. 
According to the 2017 Democracy Index, it ranks 68 out of 167 states with a score of 6.39. 
This score and rank position Indonesia as a flawed democracy. Indonesia oftentimes uses its 
status as a democracy and its experience in dealing with conflicts to build its public identity. 
One of its way is by initiating and annually conducting the Bali Democracy Forum; a capacity 
building and experience sharing forum for all types of democracy. Economic-wise, Indonesia 
is the largest economy9 in South-East Asia and the only South-East Asian state which belongs 
to the G-20. By 2030, it is predicted to be the 7th largest economy in the world. 
With all these facts, Indonesia fits to be a middle power that actively cooperates in regional 
and international organizations,10 and Indonesia increasingly accepts this status as its 
international identity. Not to left behind that Indonesia was one of the initiators of 1955 Asian-
African Conference and one of the founding members of ASEAN, NAM, G-77 and OIC. 
International organizations seem to be the important core of Indonesia’s cooperation in 
international forum, as it is now member of more than 200 IOs. In the world politics, Indonesia 
positions itself as a bridge-builder between its fellow developing states and the developed 
states. 
Indonesia’s Participation in UNPKO 
The general national legal framework for Indonesia to participate in UNPKO can be found in 
the Preamble of its Constitution, its Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, Law No. 34/2004 
on the Reform of Indonesian Armed Forces, Law No. 2/2002 on Indonesian State’s Police, and 
Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence (Hutabarat, 2014: 186). As elaborated earlier, Indonesia’s 
participation was suddenly increased in 2004, when it sent 188 troops to MONUC (Hutabarat, 
2014: 187). Since then, Indonesia keeps growing the number of its troops deployed in UNPKO. 
Now, Indonesia has sent thousands of peacekeepers to several operations, which positions itself 
in rank 8 out of 124 troop contribution states.11 
                                                          
9 GDP-wise. 
10 Further discussion on middle powers is provided in the next Chapter. 
11 Data taken from 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_by_country
_mission_and_post.pdf.  
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Figure II.2. Trend of the deployment of Indonesia’s personnel12  
 
Graphic II.2 shows a relatively positive trend regarding Indonesia’s decision in deploying its 
personnel to UNPKO. This increasing number of deployment goes hand-in-hand with the 
policy shift. In recent years, Indonesia began to openly state the importance of participation in 
UNPKO as one of its foreign policy priority. There are four important decisions (among many 
efforts) which support the increasing number of deployment. First, in 2011, Indonesia 
established a Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions (Tim Koordinasi Misi 
Pemeliharaan Perdamaian/TKMPP) under Presidential Decree No. 85 of 2011 (Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry, 2016). The mandate of TKMPP is to prepare policies and manage crucial 
steps regarding Indonesia’s contribution in UNPKO. It has the functions to: 
“a). coordinate the planning, preparation, execution, and termination of Indonesia's 
participation in peacekeeping missions; b). prepare a comprehensive study and 
recommendations on policy related to Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping 
missions; c). prepare and formulate positions and strategies in the negotiations on 
Indonesia’s participation in peacekeeping missions; d). monitor and evaluate 
Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping missions.” (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 
2015) 
This formulation is a response to the phenomenon of how UNPKO mandate has become more 
multidimensional. TKMPP is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and consists of the heads 
of relevant governmental institutions, namely Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and 
Security, Minister of National Development Planning, Minister of Law and Human Rights, 
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Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance, Chief of National Police and State Intelligence 
Agency, Army Commander, and the Cabinet Secretary.  
Second, in 2012, Indonesia established the National Army Peacekeeping Training Centre in its 
Peace and Security Centre. This is aimed to prepare Indonesian army to meet the UN standard 
before being deployed as peacekeepers, and at the same time functions as a bilateral or regional 
training/workshop ground with other participating states. In the future, Indonesian National 
Police will also establish a Police Training Centre to prepare its personnel for deployment in 
UNPKO. 
Third, in 2014, Indonesia set an ambitious goal to have 4,000 UN peacekeepers by 2019. This 
goal is supported by a “Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019” document, which is 
a legal national document based on the Foreign Ministry Regulation no. 5 of 2015. It acts as a 
“strategic guideline to materialize the Vision” (Indonesian Foreign Ministry, 2016). Fourth, in 
2015, the government firms a solid and direct legal basis for the deployment of Indonesian 
peacekeepers by issuing the Presidential Decree no. 86 of 2015. With this Presidential Decree, 
the decision-making process to deploy troops in certain peacekeeping missions is more 
coordinated and more legitimate in terms of national law. Before the presence of this legal 
basis, the government laid the deployment of peacekeepers on the general laws, as elaborated 
earlier in this overview. 
With all the efforts the government puts to support the increase of Indonesian peacekeepers 
deployment, by the end of March 2018, there are 2,695 personnel deployed in nine operations. 
This number puts Indonesia as the 8th biggest participating state out of 124. The following chart 
provides detail information of the disbursement of current Indonesian personnel. 
 
Figure II.3. Disbursement of Indonesian Peacekeepers, as of 31 March 2018 
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II. 2. Relevant Literature on Why States Participate 
The subchapter elaborates on recent and relevant literature regarding the reason behind states’ 
participations in UNPKO. There are two kinds of researches explains in this writing, the 
general researches (which analyse states’ participations in general by using large-N data) and 
case studies on several states, including Indonesia. This subchapter ends with a reflection on 
what this study offers after analysing previous researches. 
 
II. 2. 1. General Researches 
There have been efforts to understand motivations behind states’ participations in UNPKO, 
and to formulate a generalized theory in explaining those motivations. The most common ones 
are coming from the perspectives of realist, liberalist, public good theory, and civil-military 
relations (institutionalist).  According to a realist perspective, states participate in UNPKO only 
if it is in line with their national interests. Consequently, states would not support a 
peacekeeping operation if it is contradictive with their national interest (Neack, 1995: 182). 
Liberalist perspective explains this phenomenon by using its democratic peace theory. It 
emphasizes that democracies are more likely to participate in UNPKO than non-democracies, 
because democracies see UNPKO as an effective instrument to spread democratic values, 
particularly after the end of the Cold War (Daniel et al, 2008: 27). 
Public good theory views UNPKO as impure public goods. Therefore, states’ participations in 
UNPKO is the provision of impure public goods. It means that states are willing to deploy their 
personnel when the deployment provides them with private benefits for the states themselves; 
as well as for the personnel deployed (Bellamy and Williams, 2013: 14). Lastly, according to 
the perspective of civil-military relations, the motivation behind states’ participations to 
UNPKO lays in the hand of states’ military institutions. If the military institution is willing to 
send its personnel to UNPKO because it sees the deployment as militarily beneficial, then the 
state participates in UNPKO; and vice versa (Velazquez, 2010: 162).  
As each of the above-mentioned perspectives stands alone, they do contribute to the literature 
by explaining states’ reasons behind their contributions to UNPKO according to different 
perspectives. However, decision to deploy personnel to UNPKO is not a result of one-
dimensional decision-making process; the process ideally takes into account different 
perspectives (political, economic, institutional, security and ideological perspectives). 
Therefore, to comprehensively understand states’ reasons behind their participations in 
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UNPKO, it is important to address the phenomenon multidimensionally. Also, it is necessary 
to consider the fact that the theory to explain one state’s motivations might not be able to fully-
explain other state’s, because a certain state at certain period makes decisions based on relevant 
internal and external situation at current moment. 
Departing from this understanding, and to offer a multidimensional perspective in addressing 
this phenomenon, Bellamy and Williams (2013) propose five rationales that can be applied to 
understand motivations behind states’ participations in UNPKO. They acknowledge the four 
aforementioned one-dimensional perspectives, but they see them as problematic because each 
of those perspectives explains the phenomenon one-dimensionally. According to them, there 
are political, economic, security, institutional and normative aspects that need to be addressed 
to understand motivations behind states’ participations in UNPKO.  
The first rationale, political, argues that states see their participations to UNPKO as an effective 
instrument to achieve political objectives. The economic rationale argues that states participate 
in UNPKO to pursue economic incentives. As the UN provides compensation payments for 
troop-contributing states, in national level (especially for small states) it can be useful to 
support national budgets; in institutional level, the payments can be directly used to expand 
defence and security budget; at individual levels, the personnel (military, police or civilian) can 
benefit economically from being deployed, as they receive US$1,410 per month; national 
corporations can also take advantage by providing goods, weapons and transportation to the 
UNPKO through UN procurement procedure. 
Security rationale argues that states participate in UNPKO when the addressed conflict threats 
their security interests (not necessarily core national security interests). The institutional 
rationale, also known as civil-military relations explains how a state’s decision to participate 
in UNPKO is influenced by the bureaucratic dynamic between the core institutions and how 
the military institution views participation in UNPKO. Lastly, normative rationale argues that 
states participate only for normative reasons, such as to further their ideology to be good 
international citizens.  
These rationales are a result of comprehensive case studies on fourteen different states (the P-
5 states, top-five UNPKO troop contributors in 2000-201013, and four rising troop contributors 
                                                          
13 Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Ghana, Nepal and Uruguay. 
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for the same period14). I use these rationales of Bellamy and Williams as a theoretical model 
for this study. Further elaboration on this is provided in the next Chapter. 
 
II. 2. 2. Case Studies 
Attention was paid to some case studies on different states (in-depth and comparative case 
studies). I found no case studies which apply Bellamy and Williams’ multidimensional 
rationales and thus their theoretical model. This is probably because their writing is only 
published four years ago.  
Academic attention to Indonesia itself is not very extensive yet. I chose two most recent and 
comprehensive researches to be included in this review. The first one is a comparative case 
study between Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s motivations to participate in peacekeeping activities 
(Cook, 2014). The argument regarding Indonesia is that Indonesia’s participation is driven by 
several motivations, which are military, economic and political (Cook, 2014: 165). The reasons 
behind Indonesia’s participation in world peacekeeping mechanisms is to gain international 
military experience, to run its ‘free and active’ foreign policy, to gain financial benefits from 
UN incentives payment, to further the then-President Yudhoyono’s ambition for Indonesia to 
actively participate in peace operations, and to use and expand the market of the weapons and 
Armored Personnel Carriers produced by Indonesia (Cook, 2014: 165).  
Although this research provides a comprehensive explanation from several dimensions 
(military, economic and political), it does not touch upon more necessary dimensions.15 It left 
out potential influences from Indonesia’s possible interest to contain (or perhaps maintain) 
conflicts and Indonesia’s ideology to maintain world peace and be a good citizen of the world. 
Also, this research focuses on peacekeeping and conflict management in general (it also 
discusses the ad-hoc peacekeeping team in Southern Philippines, the notion for ASEAN to 
have its own peacekeepers, and other bilateral efforts of conflict management; not only 
UNPKO), so it does not specifically provide reasons why or why not Indonesia participate in 
UNPKO. 
Capie (2016) shares similar arguments regarding economic motive. However, he pointed out 
two other important factors. First, the civil-military relations of Indonesia plays a big role in 
                                                          
14 Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and Japan. 
15 By ‘more’ I mean comprehensively address five dimensions: political, economic, security, institutional and 
normative; as introduced by Bellamy and Williams. 
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the fast-changing situation since 2011.16 Second, that Indonesia participates for the sake of 
international recognition as a democracy that is “ready to play a larger role on the international 
stage” (Capie, 2016: 11). This research does not put sufficient attention to the foreign political 
goal, as it focuses only on identity as a democracy but neglects other political factors such as 
whether there are certain foreign policy goals Indonesia wants to achieve by participating to 
the UNPKO. In other words, like the previous research, this one cannot explain the 
phenomenon through more necessary dimensions, but only institutional, economic and political 
dimensions.  
Besides those two, there are non-Indonesia’s case studies which are interesting to observe. The 
first one compares China’s and Japan’s increased participation in UNPKO. It is argued that 
both China and Japan position themselves as ‘frustrated great powers’, a term which refers to 
states with great power but still feel insecure about its position in international forum. 
Therefore, those ‘frustrated great powers’ feel the need to assure their positions by gaining 
recognition from other states in order to be seen as ‘legitimate great power’ (Suzuki, 2008).  
The findings of this study elaborate that both China and Japan utilize UNPKO as an instrument 
to build public image to different audiences. For China, the ‘audience’ is the Western great 
powers. With its status as a rising hegemon in the region, China seems to see itself as leader of 
the Third World states. However, it still carries a marginalized ‘legitimate great power’ status 
for the Western states after the Cold War. This situation leads to China playing ‘recognition 
games’ (one way of it is to participate more in UNPKO) to upgrade its status in international 
society (Suzuki, 2008: 58). Japan, on the other hand, seems to be accepted as equal by the 
Western great powers. Its ‘audience’ in building public image through participation in UNPKO 
is non-Western states. According to this research, Japan seeks recognitions from its fellow non-
Western states, particularly with its status as former colony before the end of the Second World 
War (Suzuki, 2008: 59). 
For both China and Japan, participation in UNPKO allows them to demonstrate their 
willingness and commitment to fulfil ‘legitimate great powers’ responsibility, which is 
beneficial to maintain their good images to their respective audience and tackling negative 
criticisms towards them (Suzuki, 2008: 54-55). This research addresses the phenomenon in its 
political dimension and provides in-depth discussion on current international political situation 
and how it affects the increased contributions of China and Japan. It left out the other 
                                                          
16 It is unclear why the author put 2011 as a starting point. 
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dimensions economic, institutional, security and normative). Also, it does not explain why both 
states choose UNPKO as an instrument to upgrade their international status and increase their 
positive public images.  
The second case study performs a controlled comparison between three Latin American states: 
Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. It addresses the issue using civil-military approach and argues 
that there are three variants of military doctrines that explain why a state participate or not to 
UNPKO (Velazques: 2010). The first one is external doctrine, which manifested in how 
military forces use to “protect the state against external security threats” (Velazques, 2010: 
173), states with this doctrine usually participate in UNPKO. The second one is internal 
doctrine or national security doctrines, where armed forces are deployed domestically to 
maintain national stability. States with this doctrine are most likely to be resistant in sending 
troops to UNPKO. The last one is mixed doctrine, that is in the middle of the first and second 
doctrine and produces unclear orientations. States with this doctrine might participate in 
UNPKO.  
According to the three doctrines, it is concluded that Argentina has external doctrine, Mexico 
has internal doctrine and Brazil has the mixed one (Velazques, 2010: 174-175). This explains 
why Argentina is the most participating one among these three states, while Brazil positions in 
second place and Mexico is the least participating one. This research focuses only on 
institutional dimension of states’ participation in UNPKO. As UNPKO is not only beneficial 
for the military institution, it should have considered other factors that might drive a state to 
participate in UNPKO; such as political constellation of the conflicts dealt by missions in which 
those three Latin American states choose to (or not to) participate in and other foreign policy 
goals that they have which can (or cannot) be furthered by deploying personnel in UNPKO; 
also other rationales to participate (economic, security and normative). 
The third case study is Khrisnasamy’s case study on Bangladesh’s motivation to participate in 
UNPKO. Bangladesh is one of top participating states in UNPKO. This research positions 
Bangladesh as a small, poor state that eagerly participates in UNPKO to enhance its global 
image, “as part of its overall strategy of attracting greater economic assistance and foreign 
investment” (Khrisnasamy, 2003: 25). It provides four motivations of Bangladesh’s 
participation.  
First, Bangladesh participates as an act of goodwill; to be able to contribute in promoting 
international peace and security. As a former colony, Bangladesh grows empathy to other states 
21 
 
with unstable political and security condition. Second, Bangladesh’s participation is seen as an 
instrument to develop its economy. The UN allocates certain amount of payment per soldier to 
participating state, which can be used for increasing national income.  
Third, Bangladesh hopes that its participation can enhance its positive international image, 
which will attract more international support and foreign investment that can help boosting its 
economy. Lastly, by sending its troop to UNPKO, the military can be free of being politized 
and interfere in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs. It is also important to “keep the troops 
occupied” and reduces the changes for a military coup to happen (Khrisnasamy, 2003: 37). 
Even though this research provides interesting findings, it does not provide all necessary 
factors, particularly possible political motives (from Bangladesh’s foreign policy goals) and 
Bangladesh’s interest to contain conflicts in the region as well as internationally.  
 
II. 2. 3. Reflection 
Bellamy and Williams’ model of rationales is currently the most relevant and comprehensive 
model to explain states’ motivations by pointing out five necessary aspects on what motivate 
state to participate and/or to increase its participation. For the case studies, all which I 
encountered addressed the phenomenon as a one (or only several) dimensional problem but no 
one explored the participation in five dimensions comprehensively. This is unfortunate, 
because state’s decision to participate in UNPKO is led by more than one factors.  
I am aware that one-dimensional analysis cannot be considered as significant weakness of a 
study. However, in this topic of explaining the phenomenon of state’s participation in UNPKO, 
a multi-dimensional analysis is necessary, because state’s decision to participate in UNPKO is 
not a result of the consideration of only one aspect. Of course, one can say that one dimension 
influences a state to participate more in UNPKO, but does a government really make a decision 
only based on one dimension? How can we understand the bigger picture comprehensively if 
we only finger-point one or two or three aspect(s) that the government considers during the 
decision-making process? 
Therefore, in order to address this multi-dimensional phenomenon, I believe that a multi-
dimensional approach is needed. Currently, the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams is 
the most relevant one, as it consists of five dimensions (political, economic, security, 
institutional and normative) in looking and trying to explain motivations behind state’s 
participation realistically as one big picture.  
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Furthermore, it might be argued that by combining all relevant previous studies discussed in 
this Chapter, one can simply conclude state’s motivations through all dimensions; but I do not 
think one can do that. To be able to explain a phenomenon (one state’s participation in UNPKO 
during a certain period of time), it is necessary to address all five aspects at one time, using one 
methodology and within one analytical time frame. In other words, all necessary aspects must 
be tested within one framework in order to get more comprehensive findings. Besides, by 
addressing all aspects simultaneously, the researcher can further learn how those aspects 
interact and influence one another. 
Reflecting on these aspects, this case study of Indonesia’s increased participation in UNPKO 
for the period of 2004-2018 offers a comprehensive and tailor-made study to be contributed to 
the literature. All necessary perspectives are taken into account in this study, addressed 
simultaneously within one method and one time of analysis. It applies Bellamy and Williams’ 
model to explain the motivations behind participation in UNPKO; and to extend the 
understanding, middle powers theory is used to interpret the findings.17 This case study 
optimally contributes to the literature because (1) according to what I found, there has not been 
an application on Bellamy and Williams’ model into case studies, and (2) there have not been 
studies which addresses Indonesia’s motivations to participate in UNPKO multidimensionally 
(comprehensively using all five rationales), particularly for that period of time. 
  
                                                          
17 The reason on why I use middle powers theory can be found in the next Chapter, apart from the fact that I 
did not encounter any previous researches on Indonesia that use this theory to interpret the results. 
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III. Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
o approach the phenomenon multi-dimensionally, this research explains state’s 
motivation by applying the model of five rationales introduced by Bellamy and 
Williams (2013) to the case study chosen. These rationales are considered as the most 
suitable model that can be utilized, not only because it is a case-studies-based model which 
offers a multidimensional approach, but also because this approach is the most comprehensive 
one so far, as it is quite recent (in 2013) that it reflects the current situation of UNPKO and 
states’ participations in it. Therefore, it is necessary to apply this model and see whether it fits 
and explains well Indonesia’s increased participation in UNPKO since 2004. After analysing 
how those rationales apply in the case study, the results will be interpreted using the perspective 
of middle power behaviour. Middle power status affects how states interact with others; and 
when a state perceives itself (and/or if it is perceived) as middle power, it might influence its 
foreign policy and decision-making process; including the decision to participate in UNPKO. 
  
III. 1. Bellamy and Wiliams’ Model 
There are five rationales proposed by Bellamy and Williams, and each of them consists of 
motivations (why states choose to participate) and inhibitors (why states choose not to 
participate). The rationales are political, economic, security, institutional and normative 
rationales. The decision whether state chooses to participate (or increase its participation) in 
UNPKO or not depends on the state’s preference between those motivations and inhibitors. 
In political rationale, participation in UNPKO is seen as an instrument to achieve political 
objectives. By participating, states hope to increase its national prestige as well as its leverage 
in international affairs. In a long run, the participation can function as a tool to achieve or 
protect state’s other foreign policy goals (for example, seeking supports from other member 
states for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC). On the other hand, a state will be reluctant to 
provide peacekeepers if there are other more strategic priorities that it must face (such as 
internal conflict or direct, immediate threat to its national security). Furthermore, state might 
hesitate to contribute if it is worried of its reputation, in which can be damaged by, e.g. the 
T 
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failure of certain operation in which it decided to deploy its troop and the presence of abusive 
or violating act of its peacekeepers (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 419).  
The second one, economic rationale, indicates that the incentive payment system offered by 
the UN allures states to participate in UNPKO. The benefit from receiving this payment is not 
only experienced by the national government (particularly small, poor states that need extra 
money to accelerate its national budget) but also by the armed forces institution (to increase its 
budgeting), individuals or the peacekeepers themselves (as they are paid properly) and firms 
or corporations that provide military needs by joining UN procurement (Bellamy & Williams, 
2013: 19). However, when this compensation is smaller than the actual troop deploying costs 
(in which state must prepare its personnel to meet the UN standard in terms of training, 
capability and equipment), state is reluctant to participate more (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 
421). 
Security rationale explains that states tend to participate if they feel the actual need to protect 
its security from a conflict (does not have to be core national security interests) that they decide 
to take part in containing and solving the conflict (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 20). On the 
other hand, if there is doubt and institutional antipathy towards the UN, that it cannot further 
their security interests at minimum cost, they will prefer to participate in other missions or 
taking unilateral actions (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 421). 
Fourth, institutional rationale, points out that civil-military relations influences state’s decision 
to participate or not to UNPKO. A state is more likely to participate when military institution 
can take advantage from the contribution, for example, if armed forces think that joining 
UNPKO provides vast international experience for its troop, state might send more 
peacekeepers; as it is a better option than having their military interfere to domestic affairs and 
being politized (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 20). However, if the military institution is 
antipathy to the UN (because of negative experience in the past in cooperating with the UN), 
there will be a strong resistance to participate more in UNPKO. Furthermore, the presence of 
internal rewards for peacekeepers inside the armed forces, such as extra payment or career 
promotion, can help increase the enthusiasm of the military personnel to be peacekeepers and 
hence increase the state’s participation in UNPKO (Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 422). 
Lastly, normative rationale, explains that states participate in UNPKO because they see it as 
the right decision to take normatively. According to this rationale, the decision to participate 
(also to increase the participation) in UNPKO is not fully driven by the interests, but by 
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ideology and goodwill. This is reflected by the motivations of the rationale, namely ‘to be good 
Samaritan/humanitarian’ and ‘to support the UN system’. In other words, state would be more 
likely to increase its participation when it perceives UNPKO as a strategic way to further its 
ideology of being good humanitarian state and when it is willing to support the UN system. On 
the other hand, state will draw back from its participation (by reducing the troops deployed or 
not participating at all) when the mandate and agenda of UNPKO is not in line with the state’s 
ideology. States’ main ideology here is to support the maintenance of international peace and 
security under the UN framework, so that they can be good international citizens (Bellamy & 
Williams, 2013: 20).  
The summary of those rationales, along with the motivations and inhibitors, is as shown in the 
table below. 
Rationale Motivation Inhibitor 
Political - National prestige 
- Voice in international affairs/UN 
- Further other foreign policy 
goals 
- Alternative priorities 
- Exceptionalism 
- Difficult domestic politics 
- Damage to national reputation 
Economic - Financial rewards: states, 
ministries, militaries, 
individuals, and firms 
- Imposes additional costs 
Security - Resolve regional conflicts 
- Contribute to global peace 
- Preference for non-UN solutions 
Institutional - Gain operational experience 
- Prevent military involvement in 
domestic politics 
- Improve interoperability 
- Legitimize armed forces 
- Military antipathy to UN 
- No internal incentives for UN 
peacekeeping 
Normative - Good Samaritan/Humanitarian 
- Support UN system 
- Discomfort with normative agenda 
- Discomfort with ‘robust’ 
peacekeeping 
Table III. 1. Rationales of state’s participation in UNPKO18 
 
 
III. 2. Middle Powers Theory 
Middle powers theory is utilized in this study to extend the understanding of its findings. After 
applying Bellamy and Williams’ model of rationales to the case, the behaviour of Indonesia is 
                                                          
18 Adapted from Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 423. 
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interpreted using middle powers theory. The argument here is that middle powers tend to 
actively participate in UNPKO, and that the model of Bellamy and Williams explains why the 
states choose to participate. The study has no intention at all to test the theory of middle powers, 
but to use it as an instrument to interpret the application of Bellamy and Williams’ model. 
Middle powers are states with the level of global capabilities behind great power states but 
above the small power states (Manicom & Reeves, 2014: 27). There are no fixed criteria for a 
state to become a middle power. However, middle powers are often argued as the ones with 
average material capability, proactive behaviour and ideational belief to use multilateral forum 
to pursue their interests while at the same time being a good citizen of the world.  
The main characteristic of middle powers’ foreign policy is that it is influenced by their 
positions in the global system (Jordaan, 2003: 166). Middle powers are known as having an 
interest in maintaining global stability and preserving the status quo for the sake of their own 
foreign policy goals. This interest, however, seems selfless and therefore help create the image 
of middle powers as good global citizens. Most middle powers actively interfere in 
international issues in a proactive way (compared to least-powerful states than the middle 
powers), even though the issues are not their immediate or direct concern (Jordaan, 2003: 166-
167).  
In protecting stability, middle powers place conflict management as an important part of their 
foreign policy. They like to be involved in mediation and peacebuilding activities as a form of 
their contribution to international peace, as well as a way to pursue their self-interests 
(Manicom & Reeves, 2014: 28, 31). Their positive image as neutral states or ‘honest broker’ 
is advantageous for them in this case. Typically, they use international organizations as 
channels to get involved in conflict management and resolution. 
Middle powers utilize international organizations as the main instrument in achieving their 
foreign policy goals. They perceive international law as beneficial to protect their interests, and 
international organizations provide security for them in this case. Furthermore, within 
international organizations, middle powers can get stronger voice by cooperating with like-
minded states (Jordaan, 2003: 169). 
There are two types of middle powers, the traditional ones and emerging ones. They basically 
share similar features in terms of characteristics, but some of their key differences make them 
behave differently in some issues. Traditional middle powers are those Western middle powers 
born during the World War II (e.g. Australia, Canada and the Netherlands). They are politically 
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and economically stable, and their further main role was to create balance in the Cold War 
between two great power states at that time (Jordaan, 2003: 172). Today, most traditional 
middle powers are active in the international cooperation on world climate and possess 
significant position in economic cooperation.  
On the other hand, emerging middle powers are those ex-colonies, non-Western states born 
right after the World War II. With this background, they are mostly young democracies with 
low to medium economic power. They play dominant role regionally and tend to cooperate 
with other like-minded non-Western middle powers in international organizations (Jordaan, 
2003: 174-177). Indonesia is considered as the latter type of middle power: an emerging one 
(e.g. in terms of population size, economic growth, role in regional forums) (Holbraad, 1984, 
Ping, 2005, and Manicom & Reeves, 2014).19  
Middle powers and UNPKO share a close history. After the World War II, it was the traditional 
middle powers who pioneered the UNPKO (Cooper & Dal, 2016: 517), and saw it as a proper 
instrument to emphasize their roles in international cooperation on security and peace. In other 
words, UNPKO is a tool created by middle powers to show their existence and importance in 
terms of international politics and security (Neack, 1996).  Today, most of the UNPKO 
participating states are emerging middle powers (as the traditional ones more focus on 
economic and climate change cooperation). They tend to fill the gaps in international 
cooperation where great powers avoid participation because of exceptionalist way of thinking.  
 
III. 3. Central Argument and Hypotheses  
The central argument of this research is that the status as middle power influences a state’s 
behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO 
because it perceives the participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their 
prestige in international politics. The motivations in all Bellamy and Williams’ rationales 
support what is important for a middle power. Therefore, as each rationale consists of 
motivations and inhibitors, a state’s preference towards the motivations and inhibitors affects 
the decision on whether that state decides to participate more or not. Some rationales might be 
                                                          
19 Further explanation on Indonesia’s status of middle power and its active participation in UNPKO is elaborated 
in the next Chapter. 
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more dominant than others, it depends on the situation of each state’s internal political 
condition and its status in global politics.   
In the case of Indonesia, my argument is that the motivations for Indonesia to increase its 
participation in UNPKO since 2004 are affected by each one of the rationales, even though 
some rationales might be more dominant than the others. Past studies would lead us to assume 
that political and economic rationales might be the dominant ones for Indonesia. Its status as 
middle power and the relatively stable political and security situation (internally and 
regionally) also influence Indonesia’s decision to participate more to UNPKO. 
Based on the central argument, this research provides five hypotheses to explain why states 
participate more to UNPKO. To be fitted to the case study, the terms ‘state’ below can simply 
be adjusted into ‘Indonesia’ in order to make the hypotheses more contextual. 
The main purpose for a state to cooperate in international forum is to protect the national 
interests. These interests can be perceived as something wide, but one of the most important 
interests is the political one. State’s behaviour in international cooperation is driven by political 
foreign policy goals, because when you achieve your political goals, the other goals such as 
economic can follow as spill-over effect. The interest to achieve national prestige, positive 
image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are reflected as foreign 
policy goals which can be pursued through participation in UNPKO. Therefore: When 
participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective instrument to pursue its foreign policy 
goal(s), state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 1). 
Most of the troops contributors in UNPKO are relatively new-born, developing states that are 
former-colonies. Increasing financial income is important for a state to develop the economy. 
Not to mention that getting foreign currency for most non-Western developing countries is a 
niche way to gain extra income. Considering this, financial rewards that are offered by the UN 
and received at the level of institutions, individuals and firms of the state affects its decisions 
to participate more. Therefore: When participation in UNPKO is perceived as financially 
beneficial because of its financial rewards, state will be more likely to increase its participation 
in UNPKO (Hypothesis 2). 
As stability is a key to build and develop economy, states possess a tendency to avoid the 
spreading of conflicts and maintain peace and order. Participation in UNPKO can be seen as 
an effective instrument to contain conflicts, therefore: When participation in UNPKO is 
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perceived as an effective tool to maintain peace by containing conflicts, state will be more 
likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 3). 
A foreign policy’s decision-making procedure is a reflection of a state’s domestic situation. In 
the case of participation in UNPKO, state can consider internal aspect in terms of military 
advantages. In this case, state perceives its participation as an instrument to achieve internal 
military advantages for its military institution, such as gaining operational experience, 
improving interoperability, legitimizing armed forces and preventing the military to involve in 
domestic politics. Therefore: When participation in UNPKO is perceived as militarily 
advantageous, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 4). 
A state might have a special interest on humanitarian issues, because of its unpleasant 
experience in dealing with colonialization and armed conflicts or simply its ideology of having 
a world that is socially justice. It sees cooperation in international organizations as a positive 
way to address humanitarian issues. Therefore: When participation in UNPKO is perceived as 
an effective way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility under the UN system, state will be more 
likely to increase its participation in UNPKO (Hypothesis 5). 
As the hypotheses are based on Bellamy and Williams’ rationales, they are affected by the 
state’s preference between motivations and inhibitors of each rationale. If it is found that in 
certain rationale the motivations are more dominant than inhibitors, then the hypothesis related 
to that rationale is supported; and vice versa.  
  
30 
 
This page is intentionally left blank. 
  
31 
 
IV. Methodology 
 
 
 
o answer the research question, this research uses a qualitative approach. 
Interpretative and explanatory case study is the most suitable research design, as it 
applies a theoretical model in explaining the case (Vennesson, 2008: 227) and helps 
in analysing a real-life phenomenon of which the researcher does not have control of (Yin, 
2009: 6). Besides, a case study is close to real-life situation and helps to develop a nuanced 
view of reality. Even though it is believed that the findings of a case study are difficult to be 
generalized, there is always something to learn from those findings, especially if the case is 
typical or well-illustrated.  
As a within-case study which aims to identify causal interpretation, congruence method is 
utilized as the methodology. The data is gathered mainly by performing semi-structured, elite 
interviews with open-ended questions to relevant government officials, as well as by analysing 
some reliable written sources to increase the validity of the study. 
 
IV. 1. Case Selection 
Being a within-case study, the case to analyse is selected to be the typical one. A typical case, 
according to Seawright and Gerring, is a representative of the population, which helps the 
researcher to “better explore the causal mechanisms at work in a general, cross-case 
relationship” (2008: 297 & 299). Indonesia is selected to be the typical case for this study. It is 
a good representative of the ‘population’ of UNPKO’s troop-contributing countries. It shares 
similar values with the other troop-contributing countries, despite of its interesting profile, 
which makes Indonesia a proper typical case to analyse. By choosing Indonesia, this study 
contributes to the literature by validating on how a causal mechanism explained by Bellamy 
and Williams’ model can be applied on a representative: Indonesia. 
Indonesia has an interesting profile as an emerging middle power. It has a long history of being 
former colony of the Dutch (as well as the Portuguese and the Japanese at some points) and 
experienced in dealing with natural disaster (such as the Tsunami in Aceh in 2004) as well as 
with internal conflicts with separatist groups (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in Aceh, Organisasi 
T 
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Papua Merdeka in West Papua, and other separatist groups in Moluccas, Java, etc.). This 
background forms a unique identity of Indonesia as a state which experienced in conflict and 
disaster management.  
Regionally, Indonesia is an active player in ASEAN. Not only being one of the founding 
members, Indonesia also always puts ASEAN as the core of its foreign policy. It believes that 
regional cooperation can increase stability in the region, therefore helps the South East Asian 
states to grow. With this belief, Indonesia actively involved in containing conflict in the region 
in order to maintain regional peace (such as assisting the Philippines and Myanmar in dealing 
with their internal conflicts).   
Indonesia is also active multilaterally. As a middle power, interactions in international 
organizations are important for Indonesia to protect its foreign policy in multilateral 
cooperation. Indonesia is member to more than 200 international organizations, in which it tries 
to fill strategic positions so that its voice can be heard. Indonesia is known to position itself as 
a bridge-builder between its fellow developing states and the developed states. 
In terms of economic development, after being able to deal with economic crisis and internal 
conflicts, its economy keeps developing and it is predicted to be one of the strongest economy 
in the region by 2030. Currently, with its growing GDP, Indonesia is the only member of G-20 
in South East Asia.20  
Indonesia shares some relatable features with other UNPKO’s participating states (which 
makes it a good typical case), such as its status as a developing state with long history as a 
former colony. As mentioned earlier in this paper, most of the states that participate in UNPKO 
are developing states from Asia and Africa. Most troop-contributing states of UNPKO share 
similar ideology with Indonesia, on colonialization and similar perspective in dealing with 
conflicts. Like some participating states, Indonesia plays an active role in South-South 
cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM).  
I am aware that the results of a case study do not always necessarily have to be generalized. 
However, there is always something to learn from a case study; because of the nature of case 
study, that provides a concrete context-dependent knowledge which is valuable for the 
literature (Flyberrg, 2011: 3). Therefore, the result of this study can be useful at some points to 
                                                          
20 http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/  
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analyse the motivations of most other UNPKO participating states, as they might share some 
of the features that Indonesia possesses.  
Indonesia’s increasing participation in UNPKO since 2004 is the most interesting factor to 
study. Its significant policy shift from before and after 200421, creates a big room for 
interpretation and further analysis on the motivation behind it. As explained in the Introduction, 
Indonesia has set an ambitious goal to have 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019, so that it can place 
itself among the top-ten troop-contributing countries. This increasing number (from only 
hundreds to thousands) proves a significant foreign policy shift for Indonesia in perceiving the 
importance of UNPKO participation. By focusing on Indonesia’s participation in UNPKO, this 
case study seeks to further contribute academically by addressing the state’s behaviour 
multidimensionally. Furthermore, the decision to choose Indonesia is prime, because currently 
there are not so many researches in this topic that focus in Indonesia.  
 
IV. 2. Variables 
The dependent variable of this research is “state’s decision to increase its participation in 
UNPKO”. This variable is operationalized by observing the trend of meaningful increasing 
number (minimum 50 personnel per increase) of Indonesia’s deployed personnel since 2004. 
The trend itself can be derived from the public monthly data on the official UN peacekeeping 
website. 
There are three concepts in this variable, namely ‘decision’, ‘participation’, and ‘UNPKO’. 
‘Decision’ refers/related to foreign policy. Foreign policy is “general objectives that guide the 
activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states” (Britannica 
Academic, 2009). In this research, ‘decision’ is the result of a thorough coordination between 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defence Ministry, and other relevant governmental institutions that 
guide state’s participation in UNPKO. ‘Decision’ can be direct, such as the pledge to deploy 
certain number of troops, and indirect, such as formulation of certain Acts (or other legal 
documents) as well as bilateral/regional cooperation documents or the rise of military budget, 
which support the increasing number of the troops deployed.  
                                                          
21 in which in the beginning of 2004 the number of personnel deployed was 188 and by the end of 2017 the 
number is rocketed into 2,688. 
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‘Participation’ refers to personnel contribution to the UNPKO (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, 
Daniel, 2008, and Moritz, 2017).  The personnel contribution in ‘participation’ can be in the 
form of military, police and/or civilian contribution. In this paper, this term is interchangeable 
with ‘troops contribution’. Lastly, ‘UNPKO’ is the “operations involving military personnel, 
undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of 
conflict.” (the UN, 1996: 4). 
This research utilized five independent variables, as follows: 
1. Foreign policy goals; it is a political variable that covers all political purposes of foreign 
policy that can be furthered by state’s participation in UNPKO, such as gaining national 
prestige and gaining voice or legitimacy in the UN. For Indonesia, my preliminary 
assumption is that the candidature for non-permanent seat in the UNSC is a foreign 
policy goal which Indonesia tries to achieve by participating in UNPKO. Other foreign 
policy goals might be observed in the data collection process. Data regarding this 
variable is gained from interviews and analysis on other secondary data sources. 
2. Financial rewards; it is an economic variable that refers to the compensation incentives 
received from the UN if a state participates in UNPKO. The benefits of this incentives 
can reach state, institutional, individual and company level. This variable can be 
measured by observing the type, amount and frequency of the UN compensation 
incentives Indonesia has received. Information on this variable is gained through 
interviews and data observation from relevant ministries. 
3. Interest to contain conflict; refers to the attention given by state to keep an armed 
conflict from spreading outside its root. In this research, it is a security variable that 
refers to state’s goals in containing armed conflicts outside its territory which are 
considered as threat to national, regional and global peace. This variable is measured 
by observing whether Indonesia’s perception of ‘peace’ includes containing conflicts 
which are geographically distant from it. Information on this variable is gained through 
interviews and observation on Indonesia’s Constitution.  
4. Military advantages; it is an institutional variable that refers to all military benefits 
gained by a state’s armed force from participating in UNPKO. The advantages include 
gaining operational experience, improving interoperability, legitimizing armed forces 
and preventing military involvement in domestic politics. This variable is measured by 
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finding out which and how much advantages Indonesia has gained, if any. Information 
on this variable is gained through interviews. 
5. Goodwill to be a humanitarian state; it is a normative variable which explains that 
participation to UNPKO is considered as a way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility as 
a good UN member state. It is measured by gaining information from interviews and 
analysing Indonesia’s official speeches regarding UNPKO. 
 
IV. 3. Hypotheses Testing 
As each hypothesis is directly related to one variable, the hypotheses (which are already 
mentioned and explained in the previous Chapter) are tested by exploring the causal relations 
between the dependent variable and particular independent variable.  
For Hypothesis 1, the independent variable is foreign policy goal(s). To test this hypothesis, 
firstly I need to seek whether there are Indonesia’s foreign policy goal(s) that can be furthered, 
directly or indirectly, by participating in UNPKO. The goals are the reflection of the 
motivations of Political rationale. Therefore, I need to seek whether any inhibitors also exist in 
the case of Indonesia, and then analyse Indonesia’s preference between the inhibitors and the 
goals (motivations). When Indonesia’s preference tends to lean to the motivations (the goals) 
than the inhibitors, this hypothesis is supported. Indonesia’s preference (for this hypothesis as 
well as for the other four ones) is judged based on the findings gathered from interviews and 
speeches analysis. 
For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable is financial rewards. This variable represents the 
motivation of Economic rationale. To test this hypothesis, I need to seek what kind of financial 
rewards Indonesia has received and what kind of inhibitors might be present, and then analyse 
Indonesia’s preference. When the financial rewards Indonesia has received are higher than the 
deploying costs it has to pay, then this hypothesis is supported. 
For Hypothesis 3, the independent variable is interest to contain conflict. To test the hypothesis, 
the information on how Indonesia perceives global peace and whether Indonesia feels the need 
to be involved in other states’ conflicts in order to manage them and prevent them from 
spreading must firstly be gained, as it reflects the motivations of the Security rationale. Then 
the information is weighed with whether Indonesia decides to be involved in other states’ 
conflicts and to choose a non-UN solution if possible, to see whether this hypothesis is 
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supported. When Indonesia’s preference on the motivations is more dominant, then the 
hypothesis is supported. 
For Hypothesis 4, the independent variable is military advantages. To test the hypothesis, I 
need to seek whether there are advantages for Indonesia’s military force by participating in 
UNPKO, in the forms of those as mentioned in the motivations of the Institutional rationale. 
These advantages are then compared to the inhibitors of the same rationale, to see which ones 
are more dominant. If Indonesia perceives that it has a stronger preference for the military 
advantages it can gain compared to disadvantages, the hypothesis is then supported. 
For the last hypothesis, the independent variable is goodwill to be a humanitarian state. To test 
this hypothesis, I need to seek information on how Indonesia positions itself in UNPKO and 
whether taking duty to fulfil humanitarian responsibility is important for Indonesia. This 
variable reflects the motivations of Normative rationale. Therefore, it is then compared to the 
inhibitors (on how Indonesia perceives the reform of UNPKO’s mandate and agenda). When 
fulfilling humanitarian responsibility is important for Indonesia and it has no significant 
objections on the mandate and agenda of UNPKO (no inhibitors), then this hypothesis is 
supported. 
 
IV. 4. Data Collection and Analysis 
The research digs up as much relevant information as possible, mainly from the government of 
Indonesia. As the primary tool, Interviews were performed to relevant officials of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The data expected to be collected from 
interviewing those institutions was an official, insight information regarding Indonesia’s 
motivations.  
All of the interviews were performed in a semi-structured, elite interviewing style with open-
ended questions, as that style is the best one to gather the data for this research. Semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions provide the possibility for the interviewer to gain a 
“detail, depth and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing” 
(Leech, 2002: 665). In the elite interviewing style, the respondent is treated as an expert of the 
topic (Leech, 2002: 663), so the interviewer is opened to any possibilities of gaining new 
relevant information. 
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Data triangulation is applied in order to raise the validity of this study. This research analyses 
all relevant, accessible written information. The focus is in the official statements and speeches 
of the state’s leader, but attention is paid as well to reliable news articles (directly taken from 
Indonesian media with good reputation and/or news from official websites of the government).  
As mentioned earlier, this research deploys congruence method in analysing the data. It is the 
most relevant and suitable methodology for this case study, as it supports study which “begins 
with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome” (George 
& Bennet: 2005, 181); and I begin with application of the model of Bellamy and Williams’ and 
middle power behaviour to explain the motivation behind Indonesia’s increased participation 
in UNPKO since 2004, in which my predictions are reflected in the hypotheses. With 
congruence method, I am able to predict the relationship between the dependent variable and 
the independent variables, without having to trace causal process that leads from the 
independent ones. A comprehensive check and explanation is performed in seeing which 
Bellamy and Williams’ rationales fit Indonesia better than the others. After that, a discussion 
will provide further information on explaining why Indonesia ends up with the decision to 
increase its participation in UNPKO, by taking into account the theory of middle power 
behaviour to interpret the findings. 
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V. Findings and Discussion 
 
 
 
V. 1. Findings 
his part elaborates the research findings, which are presented objectively without any 
interpretation or analysis from the author. The findings are mostly gathered by 
performing interviews to relevant officials of Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry 
and Defence Ministry, although some information is gathered from secondary data source, 
namely a number of relevant Indonesia’s legislations and regulations, as well as high-level 
speeches and credible news articles. Regarding the interviews, I interviewed seven officials in 
total (three from the Defence Ministry and four from the Foreign Affairs Ministry). Most of 
the interviewees I encountered requested to be referred as anonymous, they wished to be 
referred in this paper as ‘diplomats who are in charge of relevant areas’ and ‘officials of 
Ministry of Defence’. The only interviewee who does not mind being not anonymous is the 
Director-General of Defence Strategy of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence. 
The findings consist of information on the very main reason of Indonesia’s participation, the 
triggers of increased participation, the decision-making process of participation, the 
deployment process of the personnel, as well as advantages and disadvantages of participation.  
 
V. 1. 1. Indonesia’s Perception on World Peace and UNPKO  
The prime source on how Indonesia defines ‘world peace’ and how it positions itself in 
international cooperation in peace and security is the Preamble of its 1945 Constitution, which 
points out that “…in order to form a Government of the State of Indonesia that shall… to 
contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social 
justice…” (Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945, pp. 4). Through 
this paragraph, the founding fathers of Indonesia had legally mandated the government to 
actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace and security. However, Indonesia did 
not participate in UNPKO until 1957, it is due to the unstable internal political and economic 
situation from 1945-1957, in which Indonesia was still struggling as a newly independent state. 
T 
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For Indonesia, world peace means “international stability”. Depart from the Preamble of its 
Constitution, Indonesia views world peace in an international sense (not only regional), which 
means that every conflict in the world must be managed so that an international stability can 
be achieved. In other words, Indonesia is willing to take part in managing conflicts 
geographically far from its region in order to make sure that the international stability is 
maintained. This point of view is as stated during the interviews, by the Indonesian diplomat 
in charge for international security affairs, and agreed by relevant officials in the Ministry of 
Defence. 
Furthermore, according to the Director-General of Defence Strategy, Indonesia’s participation 
in UNPKO is perceived as a concrete reflection of a goal to “actively contribute to the 
maintenance of world peace and security”, as mandated in the above-mentioned Preamble.22 
UNPKO is not the only instrument to further the goal, as there are other conflict management 
mechanisms other than the UN (take for instance, ASEAN, as a regional forum in which 
Indonesia also actively contributes, and the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in the 
Southern Philippines). However, Indonesia views UNPKO as the most strategic one in 
addressing conflicts, due to the authority of UN23 to cover all regions in the world. Therefore, 
Indonesia has been willingly deployed its troops from time to time, since 1950.  
Indonesia’s ideology to contribute to the maintenance of world peace is further reflected in 
several legal documents regarding deployment of Indonesian peacekeepers. In the Presidential 
Decree number 85 year 2011 on the Establishment of TKMPP24, Presidential Decree number 
86 year 2015 on the Deployment of Indonesian Peacekeepers, Regulation of Foreign Ministry 
number 05 year 2015 on the Roadmap Vision 4,000 Peacekeepers 2015-2019, and Regulation 
of Foreign Ministry number 01 year 2017 on the Revision of the Roadmap Vision 4,000 
Peacekeepers 2015-2019, the importance for Indonesia to contribute to the maintenance of 
world peace and security places the first and utmost point of the Consideration part. 
Furthermore, the Indonesian President, Joko Widodo, has emphasized this ideology several 
times on his speeches and interviews. The most current one was when President Widodo 
delivered his introductory remarks on the Working Meeting of the Representatives of the 
Government of Indonesia with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he mentioned several 
                                                          
22 This point is also legally stated in the Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 01 year 2017, page 5. 
23 In this case, it refers to the authority of the UNSC to decide in which conflicts the UNPKO should operate. 
24 The Indonesian Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions; as introduced in the Literature Review. 
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times that Indonesian diplomats must conduct “a diplomacy that can contribute to world peace 
and prosperity” (setkab.go.id, 2018). 
 
V. 1. 2. The Trigger to Increase Participation 
Even though the main foundation for Indonesia to participate in UNPKO has been already 
created since 1945 through its Constitution, both officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Ministry of Defence agree that the significant increase of troop’s deployment began in the 
era of the then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (year 2004). Looking at the history of 
Indonesia’s domestic politics, only since the era of President Yudhoyono that Indonesia was 
ready to take bigger step on the participation in UNPKO. There are two main factors that has 
built Yudhoyono’s perspective towards UNPKO, in which he perceives participation in 
UNPKO is important.  
The first factor is his military background. He is a retired General before taking the position as 
Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs in 2001-2004 and running his 
candidature as President of Indonesia for the period of 2004-2009 (and then got elected for the 
second time for the period of 2009-2014). Peacekeeping is one of his military achievement 
during his career in the army, as he had been appointed as Chief Military Observer of the UN 
Peace Forces (UNPF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 (VIVA, 2008). His experience as a 
former-peacekeeper influences his ideology as the leader of Indonesia at that time. According 
to the Director-General of Strategic Defence, with his own positive image of UNPKO, 
Yudhoyono views participation in UNPKO as a strategic field experience for Indonesian army 
as well as to increase Indonesian military’s leverage, and then he encouraged Indonesia’s 
military institution to deploy its troop as many as possible. 
The second factor is his tendency to put positive image as one of the ultimate goals of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Yudhoyono was ambitious in building a positive image of Indonesia 
as a helpful, able and cooperative country in international conflict management. The main 
reason is that Indonesia in the beginning of his presidency in 2004 was a very young 
democracy25 which struggled to rebuild its identity after having a reputation of an authoritarian 
state with a lot of human rights violation issues. He views multilateral forum (particularly the 
UN) as a strategic instrument to build such positive image, and participation in UNPKO is one 
                                                          
25 Before the political reformation of 1999, Indonesia was under the authoritarian regime of Soeharto for 32 
years. 
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of the effective ways to show international forum how Indonesia has become a good citizen of 
the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). 
These factors deeply influenced the decision-making process in Indonesia’s foreign policy at 
that time. Within ten years of his presidency, he created a big leap of Indonesia’s participation 
in UNPKO. First, Indonesia’s participation has started to increase from tens to hundred. 
Second, under his leadership, Indonesia has vowed to deploy 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 so 
that it will sit in the top-ten troop-contributing states of UNPKO. Second, in 2011, Indonesia 
has created the TKMPP to make coordination between relevant ministries in deploying 
Indonesian peacekeepers easier and faster. 
Third, in 2012, Indonesia has built the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre (IPSC), which is 
completed with a peacekeepers training centre, to train its troops and prepare logistics needed 
accordingly based on the UN standard. The facility is claimed to be the largest in South East 
Asia, and from time to time is used for bilateral, regional or multilateral joint military 
(peacekeeping) exercises. With this mechanism, the number of Indonesian peacekeepers 
UN Photo/ Eskinder Debebe 
Picture V. 1. The then UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon delivers a lecture at 
the IPSC during the opening of the IPSC. 
Yudhoyono is there on the stage as well. 
This shows how Yudhoyono perceives 
UNPKO as important, by establishing the 
IPSC and inviting Ban Ki-moon himself to 
the opening. 
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increased significantly from 201 personnel in the beginning of his leadership in 2004 (which 
put Indonesia as rank 42nd out of 102 troop-contributing states) to 1,844 personnel in the end 
of his leadership in 2014 (rank 16th out of 122 troop-contributing states). 
As explained by the Director-General of Defence Strategy to the author, when the next 
president, Joko Widodo, was elected in 2014, he brought a different ideology than his 
predecessor. If Yudhoyono emphasized positive image building as the main foreign policy 
goal, Widodo focuses on the economic development; that international cooperation should 
contribute to the national economy.  
He continues Yudhoyono’s vision on having 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 for different reasons. 
As mentioned earlier, Yudhoyono perceives participation in UNPKO as an effective instrument 
to build a positive image for Indonesia and to provide international experience for Indonesian 
army. On the other hand, according to the personal interview with an official of the Defence 
Ministry, Widodo is known as “the president who cares more about economic development 
than a good image”. This is supported by one of his remarks during the Limited Meeting on 
Nation Branding in 2017, he emphasized that the nation branding should be able to help 
Indonesia to gain more trade and investment (setkab.go.id, 2017).  
Therefore, besides furthering Indonesian ideology to contribute to the world peace, his other 
motivation to keep sending troops to UNPKO is more likely financial. Also, UNPKO is 
strategic for Indonesian-made military equipment to be promoted and marketed. The more 
elaborated explanation on these benefits is provided later in this Chapter. Not only that 
participation in UNPKO makes the army ‘happier’ because it gives a better financial situation 
for the Indonesian peacekeepers individually (because of the monthly financial incentive 
provided by the UN), which is good for the stability of the civil-military relations.  
 
V. 1. 3. The Decision-Making and Deployment Procedure 
The decision-making process to deploy personnel in UNPKO is done through the TKMPP, and 
through the accordance of the House of Parliament (Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015, 
Article 4(1)). As elaborated earlier in the Introduction, TKMPP consists of relevant 
governmental institutions and is mandated to consider and prepare Indonesia’s participation in 
UNPKO. TKMPP provides recommendations and prepare reports to the President (Presidential 
Decree number 85 year 2011).  
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The procedure is currently as follows. First, Indonesia receives formal request from the UN 
that a mission needs a specific number of personnel. Indonesia, like other UN member states, 
does not have the authority to choose which missions they wish to participate. However, based 
on personal interview with one of the Indonesian diplomats in relevant area of charge, member 
states can still do an informal negotiation to which missions they wish to be deployed; even 
though this negotiation does not always succeed. If that happens, Indonesia would still send its 
troops as long as the mandates of the missions are in line with Indonesia’s ideology and 
interests. The personnel deployment to the missions is only based on the opening published by 
the UN itself. 
After receiving the request from the UN, TKMPP then analyses it, to see whether Indonesia 
should and can participate in that mission. Five considerations for Indonesia on whether to 
deploy its troops or not are: national interests, political consideration, basic principles of the 
UNPKO (consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except for self-defence), 
safety and security of the personnel deployed, and the availability of personnel, material, 
equipment and budgeting supports (Presidential Decree number 86 year 2015, Article 6). In 
this analysis process, the main factors to consider are whether the mandate of the mission is in 
line with Indonesia’s ideology to maintain stability and protect the world peace, the number of 
personnel the mission needs (to see how big the mission is), and whether the Indonesian army 
(and police, in some cases) is ready to provide the number of peacekeepers as requested by the 
UN. 
After concluding Indonesia’s position regarding the request, TKMPP submits a 
recommendation to the President (mostly positive recommendations that Indonesia should 
participate). If the President agrees and signed a presidential decree to participate, the Defence 
Ministry will prepare the troops and train them at the IPSC and at the same time prepare the 
main weaponry system needed as well as other logistics; the Finance Ministry will prepare the 
budget needed for the deployment costs; and the Foreign Affairs Ministry will confirm and 
announce Indonesia’s pledge to participate.  
From this step, the UN will start its procedure, called the UN Peacekeeping Capabilities 
Readiness System (UNPCRS). The UN will then send its officials to check the deployment 
preparation. If Indonesia seems to ready, then a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is 
prepared and negotiated between Indonesia and the UN. For Indonesia, the content of the MoU 
is not significantly different from one deployment to another (as every deployment possesses 
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its own MoU). This is because Indonesia does not have any specific rules of engagement for 
its peacekeepers, unless for emphasizing that its peacekeepers are neutral and not aggressive. 
After the MoU is signed, the UN will pay a pre-deployment visit, as a final check before the 
deployment. 
Even though possessing no specific rules of engagement, Indonesia has a clear legal procedure 
to withdraw its peacekeepers from a mission. According to the Presidential Decree number 86 
year 2015, Indonesia is eligible to withdraw its peacekeepers if the mandate of the mission 
changes, in which if the mandate is not in line with the basic principles of peacekeeping and 
contradictive with Indonesian ideology (Setiawan, 2015). So far, this withdrawal has never 
happened. 
 
V. 1. 4. The Advantages of Participation in UNPKO 
From the interviews with relevant government officials, UNPKO provides several advantages 
that Indonesia gains. First, politically, by participating in UNPKO, Indonesia can prove itself 
as a peace-loving state that is eligible for its voice to be heard by sitting as non-permanent 
member of the UNSC and as a member of UN Peace Building Commission (UNPBC); not to 
set aside the fact that peacekeeping is an interesting issue that can be used to gain trust and 
sympathy from Indonesian people. Regarding the image as a peace-loving state, it is 
emphasized a lot of time during the interview that Indonesia perceives positive international 
image as an important foreign policy goal. The government believes that participation in 
UNPKO increases a positive image, not only that Indonesia is supportive on the maintenance 
of world peace, but also that Indonesian peacekeepers show good performance in the field. 
Regarding the legitimacy and voice in the international cooperation, Indonesia utilizes 
participation in UNPKO as an instrument to be a member of the UNPBC; because one way to 
be a member of UNPBC is by sitting at the top-five position in UNPKO troop-contributing 
states. Furthermore, a bigger political advantage of participating to UNPKO is to use it as a 
strategic instrument to campaign Indonesia’s candidacy as the non-permanent member of the 
UNSC for the period of 2019-2020. By actively involved in UNPKO, Indonesia shows the UN 
member states that “we know our business in maintaining world peace, we know what we are 
doing, and we take it seriously,” therefore Indonesia is eligible to sit in the UNSC. By being 
46 
 
member to UNPBC and UNSC, Indonesia can increase its leverage in international forum and 
its voice can be heard more. 
 
Regarding peacekeeping as an interesting issue internally, the officials believe that 
peacekeeping can be a good campaign tool for the presidential candidates to embrace 
Indonesian army and Indonesian people in general. Peacekeeping, particularly participation in 
UNPKO, is perceived as “trendy and sexy” that Indonesian troops are deployed abroad and 
being heroes under the name of Indonesia.  
Second, economically, participation in UNPKO is advantageous in three ways: to give 
opportunity for each Indonesian army deployed in gaining extra income in the form of foreign 
currency, to provide a way for Indonesian strategic industries in military equipment to join 
procurements on every mission Indonesia participates, and to promote Indonesian made 
military equipment to other South-South states.  
Regarding the foreign currency received by Indonesian peacekeepers, it is related to the UN 
reimbursed incentive in which each peacekeeper is paid around one thousand US dollars per 
month. For a state that is still economically growing like Indonesia, the incentive is beneficial 
for the peacekeepers to increase their wealth and living standards. 
Regarding the procurements in which Indonesian strategic industries join, these small firms 
provide Indonesian troops with uniform, arms, food supply and military vehicles. This 
provision is then reimbursed by the UN as one form of its legal incentive. This helps small 
Figure V. 2. Screenshot taken from the homepage of the official campaign website of Indonesia’s 
candidacy to the UNSC 2019-2020, showing the distribution of Indonesia’s peacekeepers in 
UNPKO. This shows how Indonesia uses participation in UNPKO as a campaign tool. 
https://indonesia4unsc.kemlu.go.id/index.php 
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Indonesian firms in the military field to survive and increase production. For those Indonesian 
military industries which provide arms and military vehicles, not only that they enjoy the 
above-mentioned benefit, but also UNPKO is a strategic way to promote their products to 
fellow peacekeeping states. So far, Indonesia has actively ‘advertise’ its arms and military 
vehicles which are in line with the UN standard to other states which are also troops 
contributors. The spirit of this promotion is to develop Indonesian military vehicles and arms 
production as well as enhance cooperation with other developing states in terms of military 
equipment. However, according to personal interview with a diplomat and another one with an 
official of Defence Ministry, the promotion of Indonesian-made equipment has not made any 
successful selling yet so far. 
Third, militarily, participation in UNPKO is a good instrument for Indonesian army to gain 
international experience and to gain extra points for the promotion of their military career. 
Individually, the international experience gained by Indonesian peacekeepers from sharing best 
practices with fellow peacekeepers from other states is invaluable. Not only that they can build 
network from this sharing best practices, the Indonesian military institution also finds this 
useful as a way to evaluate and improve the quality of Indonesian troops by comparing them 
with peacekeepers from other states. Furthermore, by improving the quality of Indonesian 
peacekeepers, Indonesia can increase its opportunity to cooperate with host country and build 
a good relationship, at least militarily. Also, the better the quality of its peacekeepers, the more 
Indonesia can invite other troop-contributing states to train in IPSC, which is claimed to be the 
biggest in South East Asia. 
On the other hand, the extra points gained by each peacekeeper for the promotion of his/her 
military career is something arranged by the Ministry of Defence to increase the enthusiasm 
for Indonesian army to be deployed in UNPKO. Even though the benefit is perceived as 
individual benefit, the officials see this as still significantly beneficial. Each peacekeeper will 
gain military reward after his/her deployment, in the form of extra point to be noted as an 
individual achievement, depends on his/her military position in the mission. It will significantly 
help him/her to promote his/her military career faster than others who are not deployed as 
Indonesian peacekeepers in UNPKO.  
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V. 1 .5. The (Potential) Disadvantages of Participation in UNPKO 
According to the interviews, there are two kinds of disadvantage that Indonesia faces regarding 
its participation in UNPKO, namely the happening one and the potential one.26 The happening 
disadvantage that Indonesia faces currently is economic. Due to the US decision to reduce its 
financial contribution to UNPKO, UNPKO now is facing a difficulty on its budgeting.27 
Because of that, the UN Peacekeeping Department rearranged the procedure of troop’s 
deployment. In the past, when UNPKO requested a state to provide troops for a mission, the 
UN deployed the troops immediately when the state was ready; but now, after a state is ready 
to provide its troops, it still has to wait for the actual deployment, which can be months in 
length. This waiting period is called ‘standby time’ and any costs produced during this period 
are not reimbursed by the UN.  
The problem faced by Indonesia regarding this situation is that its peacekeeper candidates come 
from different islands of Indonesia. They are mobilized and trained in the IPSC in Sentul, West 
Java, right after Indonesia pledged its readiness to provide troops for certain missions. The 
costs of sending them from different parts of Indonesia and their living costs during the standby 
time are quite burdening economically. There are even times when the government must bring 
the troops back to their original units (usually outside Java) during the standby time because 
they are needed in their units. In paper, these standby costs are heavier than the economic 
advantages Indonesia has gained.  
Facing this disadvantage, Indonesia does not reduce, let alone stop, the troop’s deployment to 
UNPKO. Instead, the TKMPP is working on finding a solution so that Indonesia can still gain 
significant economic advantages from its participation in UNPKO. Besides, according to the 
diplomat interviewed by the author, the political advantages Indonesia has gained is way more 
invaluable than the economic disadvantages. 
Beside of that factual economic disadvantage, there are two potential disadvantages that 
Indonesia is concerned of: the reformed mandate of UNPKO and the possibility of its 
peacekeepers’ behaviour that can damage Indonesia’s reputation. Let us talk about the 
reformed mandate of UNPKO first.  
                                                          
26 The (potential) disadvantages above are economic, normative (ideological) and political. No findings 
encountered for security and institutional disadvantages. 
27 Since the US is the biggest financial contributor, this decision to reduce its contribution significantly affects 
UNPKO. 
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This mandate reform is a response to the Cruz Report28 which highly-recommends the UNSC 
to reform the mandates of several UNPKO missions, particularly the ones in Africa, in order 
to reduce casualties number of the UN peacekeepers and to address the conflicting parties more 
aggressively.29 The UNSC then decided that some missions, namely MONUSCO, MINUSMA 
and MINUSCA, are classified into “Category 5” of peacekeeping which is more robust. That 
means the mandate allows peacekeepers not to be neutral and to attack the parties if necessary. 
The effect of this reform is troop-contributing states must change their peacekeepers’ training 
program from training them to be neutral and protecting civilians into being not neutral, to be 
“ready to go to a war”, and to be equipped with proper weaponry. Most developing states are 
concerned with this reform, but the UNSC has already made the decision.30 
On this, Indonesia finds it challenging, because its peacekeepers must do more than protecting, 
which is attacking. Ideologically, Indonesia does not wish to attack a group of people (for 
example, a rebel group in a host country), only because of the operation’s mandate says so. It 
would be a bad political investment for Indonesia in the future if the group ends up governing 
the conflicting country and put Indonesian peacekeepers attack as a negative point of their 
bilateral relations. Therefore, the government views that it is important for Indonesia to take a 
very close attention on a mission’s mandates before pledging to deploy its troops. Besides, it 
is on Indonesia’s Constitution not to support any kinds of colonialization and to be neutral in 
international interactions. This issue is addressed in the Regulation of Foreign Ministry number 
01 year 2017, that Indonesia should be more careful in deploying its troops in certain missions. 
The second potential disadvantage is misbehaved peacekeepers that can damage Indonesia’s 
reputation. This one is not as tricky as the above one. So far, Indonesian peacekeepers in 
general behave according to the rules. However, the concern remains. To make sure that 
Indonesian peacekeepers behave correctly, discipline and cultural lessons become a part of 
their training before being deployed. Furthermore, the Defence Ministry provides a set of rules 
to punish a peacekeeper who behaves not accordingly and breaking the law. Internationally, 
Indonesia actively promotes the importance of preventing misbehaved peacekeepers. On the 
High-Level Meeting on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in New York, 18 
September 2017, Indonesia was one of 73 states that signed the initiative. This shows a political 
                                                          
28 A report of the Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, the Head of Mission in MONUSCO. 
29 If the parties use force and refuse to negotiate with UN peacekeepers, the peacekeepers must be ready to use 
force at them as well. 
30 Information on this paragraph is compiled from the interviews, observation on the Cruz Report, and an analysis 
of a writing by Henke (theglobalobservatory.org, 2018). 
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commitment of Indonesia to prevent the misbehaved peacekeepers, particularly in terms of 
sexual exploitation and abuse. 
 
V. 2. Discussion 
This subchapter is divided into three parts. The first one is the application of Bellamy and 
Williams’ model of rationales into the findings, the second one is the explanation of Indonesia’s 
behaviour interpreted using the theory of middle powers, and the third one links the findings 
and discussion with previous relevant literature. On the contrary with the previous subchapter, 
this one mostly consists of the author’s interpretation on the phenomenon, based on the 
findings. Some findings are also briefly mentioned at some points of the discussion to 
emphasize the context of the analysis. 
 
V. 2. 1. The Application of Bellamy and Williams’ Model 
There are five rationales in this model, in which every rationale directly related to each variable 
and hypothesis accordingly. 
a. Political Rationale 
Foreign policy goals (the motivations to participate) that Indonesia hopes to achieve by 
participating in UNPKO can be clearly analysed, they are to increase national prestige and to 
increase its leverage and voice in international forum. The early motivation is to achieve 
national prestige. What I meant by early is the period of Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004-2014), 
in which at that time, according to the findings, Indonesia perceives good international image 
as necessary and that increasing national prestige is one of the agendas of its foreign policy. 
Participation in UNPKO is viewed as a strategic instrument to further that goal; to create a 
positive image in international security cooperation and national prestige as a world-peace 
loving state. After 2014, building a positive international image and increase national prestige 
is no longer a priority (even though it is still considered as important), as President Widodo 
puts more attention in economic development. 
What has been consistently present in the presidencies of Yudhoyono and Widodo is the effort 
to increase Indonesia’s leverage and voice in international forum; in fact, it is not only simply 
present but also increasing. This can be observed from the candidacies of Indonesia as non-
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permanent member of the UNSC, for the period of 2007-2008 and 2019-2020, and the 
membership of Indonesia to the UNPBC.  
Let us discuss the candidacies as non-permanent member of the UNSC first. Being a non-
permanent member of the UNSC is not only prestigious but also strategic. By sitting there, 
even though only for one period, Indonesia can increase its role in the maintenance of peace 
and security, as well as protecting its national interests. It can even take part in deciding the 
future of each mission in UNPKO and vote for important decisions in the Council. In other 
words, Indonesia can further its goal to have 4,000 peacekeepers by 2019 by ‘taking control’ 
on the missions, take part in the UNSC to decide whether particular mission needs more troops 
or even need to be concluded. 
For each candidacy, the government of Indonesia usually starts the campaign minimum two 
years before the election year. Therefore, for the candidacy in the period of 2007-2008, in 
which the election took place in 2006, Indonesia began to campaign and collect supports from 
other UN member states at least in 2004 (the start of Yudhoyono’s presidency). It is not a 
coincidence that Indonesia started to increase its participation in UNPKO at the time when 
Indonesia began its campaign. By ‘selling’ an image as an actively contributing state to the 
UNPKO, Indonesia successfully won the election for the period of 2007-2008.  
Seen this as a good campaign strategy, Indonesia then uses the same pattern for its candidacy 
in the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020. Pledging its vision to deploy 4,000 peacekeepers in 
2019 is related to this candidacy, which election will be held in June 2018. Indonesia is 
currently active in promoting its image as a big troop-contributing state as the main campaign 
instrument. This campaign is more robust than the previous one, it can even be seen in its 
official campaign website, that most of the content of this online website is Indonesia’s active 
participation in UNPKO, as illustrated in the Findings. 
Observing this pattern, it can be further interpreted that Indonesia sees participation in UNPKO 
as an effective campaign method to show the world that Indonesia is cooperative in the 
maintenance of world peace and security, an important characteristic for a non-permanent 
member of the UNSC. This is supported by the statements of three diplomats I personally 
interviewed, that by increasing its participation in UNPKO and pledging to have 4,000 
peacekeepers by 2019, Indonesia wants the world to see that Indonesia is fully-committed in 
maintaining world peace and willingly cooperate under the UN framework; the message 
between the line: Indonesia was (and is) eligible for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC. 
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Another way for Indonesia to have its voice heard is being a member of the UNPBC. As 
explained in Findings, when a state is positioned in top-five troop contributors of UNPKO, it 
automatically becomes member of the UNPBC. Being member of UNPBC is politically 
strategic, because Indonesia can level up its contribution to the maintenance of world peace 
from only peacekeeping (through participation in UNPKO) to peacebuilding activities. There 
are several ways for a state to be able to become member of the UNPBC, namely through the 
election in the UNGA (just like the election of non-permanent members of the UNSC and other 
UN bodies), directly elected by the P-5, directly elected by the ECOSOC, and automatically 
elected by being in the top-five troop contributors. Currently, Indonesia is member of the 
UNPBC, and was elected through the election in the UNGA. Obviously, it will be beneficial 
for Indonesia to be automatically elected by keep increasing the number of personnel deployed 
in UNPKO and sits in the top-five rank. That way, Indonesia does not have to prepare a separate 
candidacy to be UNPBC member, which is costly and takes extra effort. 
According to the Findings, there are no other foreign policy goals found that Indonesia tries to 
achieve through its participation in UNPKO, except the foreign policy goals in terms of 
increasing national prestige by creating good image and escalating Indonesia’s voice in 
international forum by being member of the UNSC and UNPBC. Therefore, the last motivation 
of the political rationale, ‘to further other foreign policy goals’, is not applicable in the case of 
Indonesia.  
Apart from those observed motivations, there are potential inhibitors that must be analysed. In 
the case of Indonesia, there is no alternative priorities, difficult domestic politics, and 
exceptionalist way of thinking found. However, there is a small concern on the potential of 
participation in UNPKO in damaging national reputation. Even though maintaining good 
international image is not a priority in the era of President Widodo, Indonesia cannot afford 
damage of its reputation. As elaborated in the Findings, the government is worried that 
misbehaved peacekeepers can be a possible damaging factor for Indonesia’s reputation. 
However, as each of the interviewee emphasizes that this issue is “not a big deal” because the 
government can still prevent it and it does not affect the number of troops deployed, it makes 
Indonesia possesses no significant inhibitors in the political rationale.  
As there are no alternative priorities other than UNPKO for Indonesia to contribute to the 
peacekeeping and conflict management activities in certain areas in the world in which 
Indonesia is now deploying its troops, the inhibitor ‘alternative priorities’ of the political 
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rationale is not applicable. The summary of the presence of motivations and inhibitors under 
this rationale is as pointed out on the following table. 
Political Rationale 
Motivations Inhibitors 
1. National prestige: Present, even though 
only significant in the 2004-2014. 
2. Voice in international affairs/UN: Present, 
in the form of membership of the UNSC 
and UNPBC. 
3. Further other foreign policy goals: n/a. 
1. Alternative priorities: n/a. 
2. Exceptionalism: Absent.  
3. Difficult domestic politics: Absent. 
4. Damage to national reputation: Present, 
but not significant. 
Table V.1. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Political Rationale 
Taking into account the analysis above, and the understanding of Indonesia’s preference on 
those motivations and inhibitors, it can be observed that for Indonesia foreign policy goals that 
can be furthered by participation in UNPKO exist in the form of gaining national prestige and 
voice/legitimacy in the UN. The causal relation between foreign policy goals (independent 
variable 1) and state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (dependent variable) is 
positive, as Indonesia tends to deploy more troops after 2004 because it perceives that the 
participation: (1) plays a role in lifting Indonesia’s prestige as an actively contributing country 
to the world peace31, (2) is highly contributive in the campaign of Indonesia’s candidacy to be 
a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2007-2008, in which Indonesia was 
successfully elected by more than 80% of the UN member states32, and (3) gives Indonesia a 
strategic opportunity to be member of UNPBC automatically without candidacy needed. The 
positive causal relation is strengthened by the non-significant present of the inhibitors. 
It is then concluded that the first hypothesis of When participation in UNPKO is perceived as 
an effective instrument to pursue its foreign policy goal(s), state will be more likely to increase 
its participation in UNPKO is supported in the case of Indonesia. In other words, Indonesia’s 
perception of its participation in UNPKO as an effective instrument to further foreign policy 
goals has been motivating the increase of its participation since 2004. 
 
                                                          
31 As the interviewees emphasize a lot of times during the interviews. 
32 If Indonesia does not see it as ‘highly contributive’, it would not use the same strategy for the candidacy for 
the UNSC non-permanent seat period 2019-2020. 
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b. Economic Rationale 
As elaborated in the Findings, the financial rewards Indonesia gains at the individuals level is 
highly beneficial. The peacekeepers gain financial benefit by being monthly paid according to 
the UN incentive payment system, and this is good for their individual wealth. Also, the 
financial benefit is also gained by the Indonesian firms which produce military logistics (from 
uniforms to weaponry), as they benefited from the UN procurement incentive system.  
However, these financial rewards are not experienced at the national and institutional level. In 
other words, the deployment does not directly help Indonesia’s economic development, nor 
increasing the annual budget received by the Defence Ministry or Indonesian Armed Forces. It 
is true that the Indonesian government can make use of the participation in UNPKO as an 
instrument to promote Indonesian-produced military equipment. Nevertheless, according to the 
data shown to the author by a relevant official, there is no record of military equipment selling 
to other troop-contributing states under the promotion framework of UNPKO. Hence, the 
promotion takes place under the UNPKO circumstances has not been proven financially 
beneficial yet. 
On the other hand, Indonesia has to face the standby costs, the transportation and living costs 
of Indonesian peacekeepers ready to be deployed but still waiting for the UNSC’s decision 
when to deploy them. Unlike the regular deploying costs, these costs are not reimbursed by the 
UN. Therefore, these standby costs can be classified as the inhibitor of the economic rationale 
in Indonesia’s case, as it is imposed to the government to pay them all. As the length of the 
standby time cannot be predicted (it depends on the decision made by the UNSC), the budget 
spent by the government for the standby costs is also unpredictable; at times it can be lower or 
higher with the benefit gained by the firms and the peacekeepers.  
Even though the observation shows that the participation in UNPKO is not really economically 
beneficial, as the standby costs can be higher than the financial rewards and that the financial 
rewards are only enjoyed at the individual and firm level, Indonesia keeps sending their troops 
to UNPKO. According to one of the officials of Foreign Affairs Ministry, “the political benefits 
gained by participation in UNPKO is far more valuable than the costs Indonesia has to pay.” 
This is an interesting point that shows that in the case of UNPKO, Indonesia cares more about 
political gain than economic one, despite President Widodo’s perception on nation branding. 
The summary of the presence of motivations and inhibitors under this rationale is as presented 
on the following table. 
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Economic Rationale 
Motivations Inhibitors 
Financial rewards—states, ministries, militaries, 
individuals and firms: Present, only at the level 
of individuals and firms. 
Imposes additional costs: Present. 
Table V. 2. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Economic Rationale 
According to the above analysis, the financial rewards Indonesia experiences is not 
comprehensively present at all levels. Also, there is no causal relation proven between the 
financial rewards (independent variable 2) and state’s decision to increase its participation in 
UNPKO (dependent variable), as Indonesia continues to increase its participation despite of 
the lack of financial rewards at the level of ministries and militaries and the presence of imposes 
additional costs that Indonesia must face. The opportunity to promote Indonesian-made 
military equipment might be viewed as an economic investment for the future (if it is proven 
effective), but it cannot be counted as financially benefited so far as Indonesia has not made 
any sells yet from this promotion.  
This fact that Indonesia keeps increasing the number of its peacekeepers deployed despite of 
this financial disadvantage, and as mentioned by the Indonesian diplomat33 that Indonesia 
perceives the costs spent are lower than the political advantages gained, shows that the second 
hypothesis of When participation in UNPKO is perceived as financially beneficial because of 
its financial rewards, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO is not 
supported. In other words, Indonesia keeps increasing its participation in UNPKO even though 
it does not perceive the participation as financially beneficial. 
 
c. Security Rationale 
Understanding Indonesia’s perception of world peace is the first key to understand its interest 
to contain conflict. Looking at Indonesia’s perception of world peace, as elaborated in the 
Findings, it can be interpreted that Indonesia has the characteristic of being contributive to 
global peace and tries to prove this by participating in UNPKO. However, it is interesting to 
note that the legal mandate of 1945 Constitution for Indonesia to actively contribute to the 
maintenance of world peace has already existed since a long time ago (and Indonesia has 
always been participating in UNPKO since 1957), but the significant increase of troop’s 
                                                          
33 During the personal interview with the author. 
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deployment has only started in 2004. In other words, significant attention has been paid to 
UNPKO only since 2004. This, I argue, is caused by the internal situation of Indonesia.  
In order to understand this, it is necessary to draw the line long before 2004. Since its 
independence (year 1945) until 1965, the internal situation of Indonesia was unstable due to 
political and economic situation as a new-born country, and the rise and fall of Communism. 
Then in 1966-1999, Indonesia was under the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto. In this 
era, the Indonesian army was deliberately involved in domestic politics to maintain the regime; 
therefore, there was no interest for the government to further the mandate of the 1945 
Constitution.  
Furthermore in 2000-2003, Indonesia was in another new-born phase as a new democracy, with 
riots and separatist movements to deal with in several parts of the country. Therefore, in this 
period of time, the army was fully-occupied to bring back internal stability. Only since 2004, 
when Indonesia started to get politically stable and that the economy began to develop, it has 
time to actualize the mandate of the 1945 Constitution to actively contribute to the maintenance 
of world peace. Therefore, it can be assumed that internal stability is important for a state to 
contribute externally. Through participation in UNPKO, Indonesia can further its interest to 
contain conflicts and preserve world stability and order. Therefore, it began to increase its 
participation. 
Regarding the other motivation, namely ‘the will to resolve regional conflicts’, it is not 
applicable for Indonesia in the time period of 2004-2018. The reason is not that there is no 
military conflict in the region (South East Asia), but because there are no UN missions take 
place in South East Asia during that time. Therefore, when Indonesia decided to increase its 
participation to UNPKO in 2004, the reason was most likely not the will to resolve regional 
conflicts. For the conflicts in the region, Indonesia plays an active role to manage and resolve 
them, outside the UN framework; for example, by sending its troops and civilians to the 
Southern Philippines under the framework of the International Monitoring Team (IMT). 
The inhibitor, ‘preference for non-UN solutions’, is also not applicable. According to the 
personal interview with the official of Defence Ministry, Indonesia is not involved in any other 
organizations with peacekeeping mechanism, particularly the ones related to those missions 
Indonesia has participated since 2004. There is conflict management procedure in ASEAN, but 
ASEAN does not have peacekeeping mechanism and the current conflicts handled by UNPKO 
are not in South East Asian. The only other peacekeeping mechanism Indonesia involved in is 
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the IMT, and it is an ad-hoc mechanism led by Malaysia. Indonesia also never acts unilaterally 
in peacekeeping, even though it acts as a mediator here and there from time to time, whether 
inside its region or for its fellow South-South countries. 
Here is the summary of the presence of each motivation and inhibitor for this rationale: 
Security Rationale 
Motivations Inhibitor 
1. Resolve regional conflicts: n/a 
2. Contribute to global peace: Present 
1. Preference for non-UN solutions: n/a 
Table V. 3. The Motivations and Inhibitor: Security Rationale 
According to the analysis above and understanding Indonesia’s preference on the motivations 
and inhibitor of the security rationale, the interest to contain conflicts exists as Indonesia 
eagerly contribute to global peace. Indonesia’s perception on global peace also shows that this 
interest can be widely applied, not to be narrowed by geographical distance between Indonesia 
and the conflicting areas. The causal relation between the interest to contain conflicts 
(independent variable 3) and state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO 
(independent variable) is proven positive, as (1) there is no inhibitor presence in this rationale 
and (2) the primary and secondary sources strongly support Indonesia’s perception that 
participating in UNPKO is a good way to further its interest to contribute to global peace. 
Therefore, the third hypothesis of When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective 
tool to maintain peace by containing conflicts, state will be more likely to increase its 
participation in UNPKO is supported. As explained in the finding, Indonesia perceives its 
participation in UNPKO as an effective and strategic instrument to further its legally mandated 
interest to maintain world peace (by containing conflicts) in general, even though Indonesia 
does not have the authority to decide which conflicts it wishes to contain by its participation. 
Therefore, Indonesia has decided to increase its participation since 2004, when it is ready, and 
the internal situation is relatively stable. 
 
d. Institutional Rationale 
The military benefits that Indonesia has gained are mostly at the individual level. It is whether 
the Indonesian peacekeepers gain invaluable international experience, or they got promoted 
after coming back from their deployment, as the Defence Ministry and the Indonesian Armed 
Forces have rewarding procedure for Indonesian peacekeepers. Further paragraphs in the 
Finding section show that Indonesia sees internationally experienced peacekeepers as military 
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assets to gain influence in the region, at least to be able to legitimately invite the neighbouring 
states to have joint peacekeeping training or workshop on peacekeeping at the IPSC. 
The points above can be interpreted further this way. As its personnel are getting more 
experienced after the deployment and Indonesia becomes a good example of troop-contributing 
state in terms of the quality of the peacekeepers so that Indonesia can host related events and 
military exercise, Indonesia is at the same time enjoy the improvement of its military 
interoperability. As Indonesia is not member of any joint-military international (or regional) 
organizations, its participation in UNPKO is the most strategic way to improve its 
interoperability. Military interoperability does not have to be joint-military actions or 
equipment-sharing. By being able to communicate, interact and share common mandate with 
the peacekeepers from other troop-contributing states, Indonesia is improving the 
interoperability of its military personnel.  
The more personnel deployed in UNPKO and the more Indonesian-made military equipment 
used mostly by Indonesian peacekeepers, the more Indonesia can learn and improve its military 
interoperability. Therefore, increasing the number of personnel deployed is strategic in this 
perspective. This, at the same time, can be a way for Indonesia to internationally legitimize its 
armed force without having to be involved in certain war with the consequences of violating 
international law. 
Considering the fact that Indonesia has an unfortunate authoritarian regime experience of 
Soeharto for around 32 years, I argue that another reason to send the army abroad under the 
framework of UNPKO is to maintain the status quo of not having its army involved in domestic 
politics anymore. It is true that there is no explicit finding the author encountered can be 
directly related to this issue. However, the fact that Indonesian Law no. 34/2004 on the Reform 
of Indonesian Armed Forces used to be a legal basis for Indonesia to deploy its troops in 
UNPKO before it formulated a more specific legal basis (see Literature Review, under 
Overview on Indonesia) speaks more. Also, by understanding the past of Indonesia, particularly 
during the Soeharto regime, there is a tendency for the government of Indonesia to learn from 
the past and not letting the army (who are supposed to protect Indonesians) end up being 
misused a ‘tool’ for the leader to show his/her power and bring terror and insecurity inside the 
country.34 
                                                          
34 This situation is relatable to several states, take for example Saddam Hussein’s regime who misused his 
power to control the military to maintain the authoritarian regime. 
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Looking at the above-mentioned explanation, it is just understandable why the Indonesian 
government does not possess military antipathy to the UN (at least not in the terms of 
peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict management). When the participation in UNPKO is 
perceived as advantageous for the military, how can Indonesia military have antipathy towards 
it? The absence of military antipathy towards UNPKO is also reflected in the MoUs Indonesia 
has agreed with the UN Peacekeeping Department, in which Indonesia does not require any 
specific rules of engagement for its deployed troops. It is as if Indonesia believes in the 
ideology and mandate of the UNPKO. Furthermore, the explanation also answers why the 
Indonesian military institution willingly provides internal incentives for the personnel who 
have been deployed in UNPKO. The more peacekeepers deployed, the more advantages 
Indonesia’s military can gain. 
The summary of the presence or absence of motivations and inhibitors of this rationale is as 
shown in the table below. 
Institutional Rationale 
Motivations Inhibitors 
1. Gain operational experience: Present. 
2. Prevent military involvement in 
domestic politics: Present. 
3. Improve interoperability: Present. 
4. Legitimize armed forces: Present. 
1. Military antipathy to the UN: Absent 
2. No internal incentives for UN 
peacekeepers: Absent. 
Table V. 4. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Institutional Rationale 
After conducting the analysis above and understanding Indonesia’s preference of motivations 
and inhibitors, it is clear that Indonesia gained a number of military advantages by participating 
in UNPKO. The causal relation between military advantages (independent variable 4) and 
state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO (dependent variable) is proven positive. 
As Indonesia enjoys the international operational experience, improvement of the 
interoperability of its troops, international legitimacy of the armed forces and the prevention of 
military involvement in domestic politics by participating in UNPKO, the Defence Ministry as 
the key military institution in Indonesian government’s decision-making regarding 
participation in UNPKO fully supports the increase of Indonesia’s participation. This, at the 
same time, encourages the Ministry to provide internal incentives for Indonesian military 
personnel who are deployed in UNPKO. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis, when participation in UNPKO is perceived as militarily 
advantageous, state will be more likely to increase its participation in UNPKO is supported. 
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In other words, Indonesia can clearly feel the military advantages of participating in UNPKO, 
therefore it decided to increase its participation.  
 
e. Normative Rationale 
Normative rationale is slightly different from the other rationales, because according to it, the 
decision to participate (also to increase the participation) in UNPKO is not only driven by 
national interests, but also by ideology and goodwill. The findings show that the founding 
fathers of Indonesia proclaimed in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution that Indonesia 
supports international peace which is based on several aspects, and one of them is social justice. 
As the social injustice in the world is reflected mostly in humanitarian issues (Fleurbaey, 2017), 
it just makes sense that Indonesia tries to be involved in UNPKO because its mandate requires 
it to deal with humanitarian issues. Therefore, UNPKO is a strategic instrument for Indonesia 
to further its ideology to contribute in the maintenance of world peace which is based on social 
justice. By doing this, Indonesia can be a good humanitarian state, as mandated in its 1945 
Constitution. 
As elaborated earlier in the case selection, and emphasized through the Findings section, 
Indonesia perceives international organizations as important instruments to cooperate with 
other like-minded states. Indonesia itself is currently member of more than 200 international 
organizations in the world. With its bodies and subsidiary organs, the UN can be seen as the 
most comprehensive and biggest international organization. Based on this perspective, 
Indonesia would pay a lot of attention to be involved in the cooperation under the UN 
framework and support the UN system, as participation in the UN (in any form) can be 
perceived as directly or indirectly beneficial for Indonesia, whether to further its interests or 
ideology. Regarding the participation in UNPKO, Indonesia’s participation is then in line with 
this perspective. As Indonesia supports the UN system, the more troops deployed in the 
UNPKO, the more support it can show to the UN system. 
However, this support in the form of participation in UNPKO, can be reluctantly be furthered 
if Indonesia feels the discomfort as elaborated earlier. The findings provide no evidence of 
Indonesia’s discomfort with the normative agenda of the UNPKO. However, there are concerns 
from the government of Indonesia regarding the robust mandate of some peacekeeping 
missions, that active and aggressive Indonesian peacekeepers can be a backlash in the future 
relations between Indonesia and the host country. The concerns raised by the government is a 
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reflection of discomfort feeling towards the robust peacekeeping mandate. However, before 
jumping into conclusion that Indonesia will be more likely to decrease its participation in 
UNPKO because of the concern, it is important to understand the degree of discomfort 
Indonesia is experiencing at the moment. 
According to the personal interview the author has conducted, Indonesia views this reformed 
mandate of UNPKO as “challenging”, as it would not only breach the ideology of Indonesia to 
protect stability and maintain world peace but also be a malign political investment in the future 
relationship with the host country. Even though the Indonesian government addresses this 
robust peacekeeping mandate as concerning, there are no signs that Indonesia will withdraw or 
decrease the troops deployed in UNPKO; only that Indonesia would take a closer look on each 
mission’s mandate before deciding to deploy the troops.  
From this, it can be interpreted that the robust mandate of UNPKO will not significantly affect 
the decision of Indonesia to reduce its participation in UNPKO. It will, of course, affect 
Indonesia to decide to not participate in certain missions (by not answering the request of the 
UN to provide troops for those certain missions). However, in the bigger picture, Indonesia’s 
support to the UNPKO will be the same, reflected by the eagerness shown by Indonesia to 
increase its participation even though it might choose to participate more in certain missions 
and participate less in other missions. Also, the number of missions with robust mandates are 
not as many as the ones with traditional mandate. 
On the other hand, no ‘discomfort with normative agenda’ is found in the case of Indonesia. 
The table below presents the summary of the motivations and inhibitors of this rationale: 
Normative Rationale 
Motivations Inhibitors 
1. Good Samaritan/Humanitarian: Present 
2. Support UN system: Present 
1. Discomfort with normative agenda: 
n/a. 
2. Discomfort with ‘robust’ 
peacekeeping: Present 
Table V. 5. The Motivations and Inhibitors: Normative Rationale 
After understanding Indonesia’s preference of those motivation and inhibitors, Indonesia 
possesses a goodwill to be a humanitarian state; it is not only legally mentioned in its 
Constitution but also emphasized in related legal documents and official speeches of the 
President. This goodwill to be a humanitarian state (independent variable 5) is proven to have 
a positive causal relation with state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO 
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(dependent variable), as it is claimed as Indonesia’s main purpose to increase the number of 
the troops deployed. The presence of discomfort with robust peacekeeping agenda does not 
significantly influence the positive causal relation, as proven by solution that the Indonesian 
government has provided by carefully considering a mission’s mandate before deploying the 
troops. This is a fair solution, as Indonesia can simply reduce or withdraw its peacekeepers if 
there is concern from the government regarding the mandate, but Indonesia chooses not to do 
that. 
Therefore, the last hypothesis of When participation in UNPKO is perceived as an effective 
way to fulfil humanitarian responsibility under the UN system, state will be more likely to 
increase its participation in UNPKO is supported. It can be concluded that Indonesia believes 
that the UN system has made UNPKO an effective tool to further its national ideology to 
contribute to social justice in the form of humanitarian responsibility. Despite of its presence, 
the discomfort with robust peacekeeping mandate does not influence much on this decision 
because currently it is only at the small degree which still can be handled by the government 
by being more careful in responding the UN’s request to deploy troops in certain missions. 
 
V. 2. 2. Indonesia’s Behaviour in UNPKO as Explained by Middle Powers 
Theory 
After conducting an analysis towards the findings by applying Bellamy and Williams’ model 
of rationales, it can be concluded that four out of five hypotheses proposed are supported. 
Indonesia’s motivations to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 are political (to 
further its foreign policy goals), security (to further its interest to contain conflicts), institutional 
(to gain military advantages for its armed forces), and normative (to further its ideology in the 
world humanitarian issues). The only hypothesis which is not supported is regarding economic 
motive. According to the analysis, Indonesia’s increased participation is not proven to be driven 
by economic motive, as Indonesia has not gained significant financial gains from its 
participation (except for the individual financial rewards which the peacekeepers receive). On 
the contrary, Indonesia must prepare ‘extra budget’ on its national budgeting plan to arrange 
the standby time of its peacekeepers. And yet, Indonesia keeps increasing its participation 
despite of this economic disadvantage. 
Among the four proven hypotheses, I argue that the most dominant ones are those related to 
political and institutional motives. During the interviews, the interviewees keep emphasizing 
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the political motives (on how Indonesia perceives its participation as a good investment to 
achieve its political goals, particularly increasing national prestige and membership in the 
UNSC and PBC) as well as military advantages (that the participation gives direct benefits to 
Indonesian military institution, to enhance the quality of each personnel and the quality of 
Indonesian military in general). The arguments from both officials of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and the Defence Ministry are in line, so that the message is clear that these political 
and institutional motives are Indonesia’s prime motives to participate. This is supported by the 
speeches of the President, Foreign Affairs Ministry and Defence Ministry, as well as news 
sources which are already mentioned in the Findings, that reflects Indonesia’s political and 
institutional motivations in its participation in UNPKO. 
This, however, does not understate the security and normative motives. Those two are still 
essential for Indonesia, because they are legally mandated in the 1945 Constitution of 
Indonesia. Therefore, it will always be the basic foundation for Indonesia’s participation in 
UNPKO. The political and institutional motives are the dominant ones for this case (period of 
2004-2018), because they change from time to time. A state might behave differently in 
different times, which causes shifting in their priority foreign policy goals and what important 
for their military power. 
In the case of Indonesia since 2004, the political and institutional motives to participate in 
UNPKO are driven by Indonesia’s status as an emerging middle power. As elaborated in 
Literature Review and Methodology sections of this paper, other states as well as academicians 
put the emerging middle power status onto Indonesia since it begins to show development in 
terms of economy, active role in regional diplomacy, and cooperation under international 
organizations. The development is supported by the characteristics Indonesia has, from its 
historical background as former-colony to its successful experiences in dealing with inter-
religious groups’ conflicts and separatism groups in its territory. Indonesia perceives this 
emerging middle power status the world has given to it as an acceleration of its status in 
international politics.  
For Indonesia, being a middle power is prestigious, and it motivates Indonesia to try playing a 
more important role in the world. As stated by its Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, that 
Indonesia “will play a role as a middle power… and will remain to contribute and take an 
important role in maintaining world peace and security,” (Setiawan, 2015).35 The status as 
                                                          
35 Public statement from the Foreign Minister after her first speech in 2015. 
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middle power is also mentioned in every national legal basis of Indonesian peacekeepers 
deployment, that by participating in UNPKO, Indonesia is trying to escalate its global role 
through ‘middle power diplomacy’, in which Indonesia views itself as a “regional power with 
a selective global involvement”. 
This behaviour of Indonesia is in line with the proposed central argument of this paper, that the 
status as middle power influences a state’s behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle 
power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an 
instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their role in international politics. The proposed 
argument that the motivations for Indonesia to increase its participation in UNPKO since 2004 
are affected by each one of the rationales, even though some rationales might be more dominant 
than the others is also half-supported by the findings. Even though it turns out that Indonesia 
does not possess strong economical motive under its participation in UNPKO since 2004, some 
rationales are indeed more dominant than the others. Also, its status as middle power and the 
relatively stable political and security situation (internally and regionally) do influence 
Indonesia’s decision to participate more to UNPKO. 
Looking at this argument through the political motives, Indonesia’s status as a middle power 
drives it to perceive positive image as necessary in international politics. As it does not have 
sufficient material power to be hegemons, middle powers like Indonesia perceive national 
prestige and positive image as elements of non-material power which are important for them 
in interacting with other states. The state feels the need to reassure its importance in 
international affairs, have its voice heard and gaining influence (Holbraad, 1984: 203). Middle 
powers are “especially keen to reaffirm their status and identity and are therefore particularly 
sensitive to prestige and image issues which might be advanced through peacekeeping” 
(Bellamy and Williams, 418). For Indonesia, the interest to achieve national prestige, positive 
image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are reflected as foreign 
policy goals which are pursued through its participation in UNPKO. This explains how its 
status as middle power influences Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO, 
in the perspective of political rationale. 
In terms of institutional motive, even though usually has an active foreign policy, a middle 
power at certain points can make decision based on its domestic reasons (Holbraad, 1984: 7). 
In the case of participation in UNPKO, Indonesia considers internal aspect in terms of military 
advantages. It perceives its participation as an instrument to achieve internal military 
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advantages for its military institution, such as gaining operational experience, improving 
interoperability, legitimizing armed forces and preventing the military to involve in domestic 
politics. Also, even though more likely internal, the motive to gain military advantage can be 
perceived as a way for Indonesia to accelerate its image as a militarily experienced state, albeit 
the experiences are non-war ones. 
For the other two rationales which exist but not as dominant as political and institutional ones, 
my interpretation is as follows. A middle power is a supporter of international organizations 
and almost always don a “moral mantel” in its foreign policy acts (Holbraad, 1984: 70, 205). 
It tries to create balance and assist other states through cooperation in international 
organizations. Humanitarian issue is one of the issues perceived important for a middle power. 
This is why, in the perspective of normative motive, Indonesia is eager to increase its 
participation in UNPKO.  
On the other hand, in the perspective of the security motive, middle powers are known for their 
roles as mediators between two conflicting parties and active in “peacekeeping under United 
Nations auspices” (Holbraad, 1984: 71). Not only that middle power plays active role in the 
region (to contain conflicts and maintain peace), it also has a tendency to act together with 
other middle powers and perform collective security in maintaining to global peace (Holbraad, 
1984: 4, 68, 69). This characteristic reflects Indonesia as an emerging middle power. Perceiving 
participation in UNPKO as a strategic way to contain conflicts, Indonesia decides to increase 
its participation. 
To conclude, all of the supported hypotheses are in line with the middle power theory, as those 
hypotheses reflect the known characteristics of middle powers explained in the literature.36 
Also, according to what I have encountered, no middle powers theory argues about the how 
middle powers perceive the importance of financial advantages of their actions in international 
cooperation. Therefore, I interpret from the analysis of Hypothesis 2, that even though middle 
powers (just like any other states, realistically) might look for direct economic advantages from 
its cooperation in international forum, these advantages are not always the priority, as there are 
a number of other priorities that must be fulfilled, such as protecting national image and 
furthering foreign policy goals.  
 
                                                          
36 Information on this is provided in Theoretical Framework. 
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V. 2. 3. Relations with Previous Literature 
The result of this study shows confirmations as well as contradictions with previous case 
studies which are mentioned in the Literature Review. Looking at the result general,37 the 
realist argument that a state only participates when the participation is in line with its national 
interests38 is confirmed by this study. Although the realist argument does not specify what kind 
of interests a state can further by participating in UNPKO, the result of this case study which 
shows that Indonesia participates in order to further its foreign policy goals and its interest to 
contain conflict, as well as to gain military advantages, confirms that Indonesia does participate 
in order to protect its national interests. This, at the same time, confirms the argument by the 
public good theorists that a state participates in UNPKO to gain benefits of the impure public 
good provision.39 The result shows how Indonesia perceives its participation in UNPKO as 
beneficial, so the argument is confirmed.  
Looking at the result specifically, the most confirmed argument is the military one, which 
points out that state participates in UNPKO in order to gain military advantages in the form of 
personnel’s experience40 and prevention of military forces to be involved in domestic politics41. 
The second confirmed argument is that state participates in UNPKO to increase its leverage 
and build positive national image.42 The argument which points out that state participates to 
further its ideology to be involved in humanitarian issues43 is also confirmed in this study, as 
it is found that Indonesia participates not only to protect its national interests but also to further 
its ideology to contribute in social justice issues. 
On the other hand, there is a contradictive result between this study and Cook (2014) and Capie 
(2016); and all use Indonesia as the case. The result of this case study points out that Indonesia 
does not participate in UNPKO for economic reason, that the participation is not financially 
advantageous for Indonesia (even though it might be beneficial for the peacekeepers 
individually) because it has to pay for the standby costs which are unpredictable in terms of 
length of time and it is not covered under the UN incentive reimbursement system. The 
previous studies by Cook and Capie do not analyse the weighing between the standby costs 
                                                          
37 Not specifically pointing out one rationale. 
38 Neack (2013). 
39 Bellamy and Williams (2013). 
40 In line with Cook (2014), Capie (2016), Velazques (2010), and Khrisnasamy (2003). 
41 In line with Velazques (2010) and Khrisnasamy (2003). 
42 Also elaborated by Cook (2014) and Khrisnasamy (2003).  
43 Khrisnasamy (2003). 
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and the financial benefits, as it only mentions several financial benefits that Indonesia has 
gained by participating. 
Moreover, there are two arguments from previous literature are not applicable to this case 
study. The first one, the liberalist argument which argues that democracies participate more 
than non-democracies because they tend to use UNPKO as an instrument to spread democratic 
values,44 is not found in this case study. Even though Indonesia is a democracy, no evidence 
shows that Indonesia participates in UNPKO to spread certain values, particularly democratic 
values. Also, the methodology of this study is not suitable to test the argument, because this is 
a within-case study, not a comparative case study or large-N study where the author can 
compare which state participate more than the others and why. The second argument that is not 
applicable is the one raised in the comparative case study of China and Japan, which concludes 
that both states use UNPKO as a tool to accelerate their prestige and good image from 
‘frustrated great powers’ into ‘legitimate great powers’.45 This argument is irrelevant because 
even though Indonesia does try to gain positive image and national prestige by participating in 
UNPKO, Indonesia is identified as middle power, not a great power. Also, no results indicate 
that Indonesia is trying to accelerate its status from middle into great power. 
Beside those confirmed and contradictive results and arguments, the study contributes to the 
literature by raising several issues that are not mentioned in previous studies, namely the 
membership at the UNSC and UNPBC, the notion of robust peacekeeping mandate, the military 
interoperability and legitimacy of the armed forces, and the extended analysis using middle 
powers theory. The first one, Indonesia’s candidacies for the UNSC (period of 2007-2008 and 
2019-2020) and its automatic membership in UNPBC if it is in the top-five contributor rank 
are the concrete reflection of how Indonesia can gain political advantages (directly and 
indirectly) by participating in UNPKO. Even though these issues are typical (not only relatable 
to Indonesia) these are missed in the previous studies of Indonesia, as well as the case studies 
on other states. 
The notion of robust peacekeeping mandate as the reformation of UNPKO is also missed to be 
discussed in previous studies, although this is not a new issue as it is a part of the bigger picture 
of the UN reform; in which developing states are trying to fight for; for the better and fairer 
UN. It means that this issue does not only concern Indonesia, but also a lot of developing states 
                                                          
44 Daniel (2008). 
45 Suzuki (2008). 
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which are also troop-contributing states to UNPKO. The military interoperability and 
legitimacy of the armed forces is also a new issue brought by this case study. The previous 
studies do not touch upon these when analysing military advantages.  
The decision for this case study to use middle power theory to further interpret the results is 
also something new, as the previous studies that I encountered conclude at pointing out one or 
two (or sometimes three) aspects that cause a state to participate in UNPKO. I can say that this 
case study is more comprehensive because it ties the findings together to explain the 
phenomenon in a bigger picture, that all of Indonesia’s behaviour regarding UNPKO is affected 
by its status as middle power. 
There are limitations of this study. In terms of data collection, it would be more eligible if it 
consists of a visit to the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre to interview peacekeepers on 
training as well as interview with Indonesian National Police.46 If this case study had extra 
information from those sides, the discussion would be more fruitful. Now, the analysis only 
covers military personnel’s deployment, and leaving aside participation of Indonesian Police 
and civilians as peacekeepers in UNPKO. 
  
                                                          
46 As the number of Indonesia’s Police personnel deployed as peacekeepers is also growing. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 
 
aising a topic of motivations behind states’ participations in UNPKO and selecting 
Indonesia as the focus of the study, this paper proposed a research question of What 
motivates state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO?47 The topic, case 
and research question were carefully formulated after a thorough review of previous literature. 
It was found that previous researches tended to address the phenomenon one-dimensionally 
(sometimes two or three), which created a gap in comprehensively understanding a 
government’s decision-making process to participate (and increase its participation) in 
UNPKO. There was no research encountered that viewed this phenomenon multi-
dimensionally, therefore no comprehensive understanding gained on what actually motivates a 
state to participate in UNPKO. Reflecting from this, this case study offered a more inclusive 
analysis on state’s motivation to participate more in UNPKO. 
What is meant by ‘more-inclusive’ is that this study viewed the phenomenon multi-
dimensionally by applying the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams, which consists of 
five rationales behind state’s decision to participate in UNPKO. The rationales are political, 
economic, security, institutional and normative. The theory of middle powers was also utilized 
in order to further the understanding towards this phenomenon, by interpreting the application 
of Bellamy and Williams’ model using that theory.  
This study argued that the status as middle power influences a state’s behaviour in UNPKO, 
which means that middle power tends to participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the 
participation as an instrument in maintaining or even accelerating their prestige in international 
politics. The motivations in all Bellamy and Williams’ rationales support what is important for 
a middle power.  
Five hypotheses were proposed, to see the causal relations between the dependent variable of 
‘state’s decision to increase its participation in UNPKO’ and five independent variables 
(‘foreign policy goals’, ‘financial rewards’, ‘interest to contain conflicts’, ‘military 
                                                          
47 It was then refined into “What has been motivating Indonesia’s decision to increase its participation in 
UNPKO since 2004?” in order to fit the case selection. 
R 
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advantages’, and ‘goodwill to be a humanitarian state’). Those hypotheses and variables 
reflected Bellamy and Williams’ model of rationales. 
The research question was answered by performing a within-case study with congruency 
method. The research was performed by conducting data collection and analysis. Data 
collection process consisted of interviews with seven officials of Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and Defence Ministry, as well as analysis of secondary source of information (official 
high-rank speeches, relevant laws and reliable news articles). The findings were then analysed 
by applying the model proposed by Bellamy and Williams to reveal the causal relations 
between the dependent variable and each independent one. The result of this process was 
interpreted by using middle powers theory. 
After conducting the analysis, it was found that state motivations to participate in UNPKO are 
political (to further foreign policy goals), security (to contain conflicts from spreading), 
institutional (for the military institutions to gain military advantages), and normative (to further 
ideology to be good humanitarian state). It was also found in this case study that there is no 
strong economic motive, in which state keeps sending its troops to UNPKO even though the 
participation is not financially beneficial. State chooses to still participate because it perceives 
that the political and military benefits from participating as more invaluable than the economic 
disadvantage it must face. 
Furthermore, interpreting from the interviews and other secondary data analysis, it was found 
that the presence of political and institutional rationales is more dominant than other rationales. 
The political and institutional motives to participate in UNPKO are driven by status as an 
emerging middle power. In political motives, this status urges state to perceive positive image 
as necessary in international politics. For middle power, the interest to achieve national 
prestige, positive image, having its voice heard and reaffirming its status and identity are 
reflected as foreign policy goals which are pursued through its participation in UNPKO. In 
terms of institutional motive, even though usually has an active foreign policy, a middle power 
at certain points can make decision based on its domestic reasons (Holbraad, 1984: 7). In the 
case of participation in UNPKO, state considers internal aspect in terms of military advantages. 
Also, even though more likely internal, the motive to gain military advantage can be perceived 
as a way for state to accelerate its image as a militarily experienced state, albeit the experiences 
are non-war ones. 
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For the other two rationales which exist but not as dominant as political and institutional ones, 
the interpretation was that middle power tries to create balance and assist other states through 
cooperation in international organizations. Humanitarian issue is one of the issues perceived 
important for a middle power. Therefore, in the perspective of normative motive, a middle 
power is eager to increase its participation in UNPKO. On the other hand, in the perspective of 
the security motive, middle powers are known for their roles as mediators between conflicting 
parties. Perceiving participation in UNPKO as a strategic way to contain conflicts, state decides 
to increase its participation. 
This behaviour is in line with the proposed argument of this study, that the status as middle 
power influences a state’s behaviour in UNPKO, which means that middle power tends to 
participate more in UNPKO because it perceives the participation as an instrument in 
maintaining or even accelerating their role in international politics. The proposed argument 
that the motivations to increase its participation in UNPKO are affected by each one of the 
rationales, even though some rationales might be more dominant than the others is also half-
supported by the Findings. Even though it turned out that state does not possess strong 
economical motive under its participation in UNPKO since 2004, some rationales are indeed 
more dominant than the others. Also, status as middle power and the relatively stable political 
and security situation (internally and regionally) influence state’s decision to participate more 
to UNPKO. 
The study contributed to the literature by raising the issues of: state’s candidacy and 
membership in the UNSC and UNPBC, the standby time and its costs, the notion of robust 
peacekeeping mandate, the military interoperability and legitimacy of the armed forces, and 
the extended analysis using middle powers theory. The study should have approached other 
relevant government institutions, namely the National Police and Peace and Security Centre. 
If this case study had extra information from those three sides, the results would be more 
fruitful. Now, the analysis only covers military personnel’s deployment, and leaving aside 
participation of Police and civilians as peacekeepers in UNPKO. This limitation can be a 
reflection for future case studies in this topic. A way more comprehensive analysis on the 
deployment of military personnel, police and experts (civilians) in UNPKO will contribute 
more to the literature.  
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Appendix 
 
 
This is the excerpt from the interviews performed during data collection process. I arranged 
this excerpt based on the questions asked, not by the interviewees, because some questions 
(and answers) are redundant. It is also safe to do this because no answers are contradictive to 
one another, they are either similar answers or complementary. For the same reason, just 
because I mentioned in this excerpt that an answer is provided from one of the Ministry (MD 
or MFA), does not mean that the other Ministry does not have opinions on the issue. To make 
everything compact, I chose the most comprehensive statements among those officials, because 
the essence of their answers is pretty much the same. 
This excerpt might not be able to cover everything mentioned in Findings and Discussion 
chapter, because it would be too long to attach them here. However, I choose the most 
highlighted issues. 
Notes: 
MFA: Official(s) from the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
MD: Official(s) from the Defence Ministry (including the Director-General of Defence 
Strategy). 
 
1. What does ‘international peace’ mean to Indonesia? 
• MFA: “For Indonesia, the meaning of international peace can be referred to the 1945 
Constitution: ‘to be contributive in the maintenance of the world peace’. Our founding 
fathers at that time were already aware to involve Indonesia in maintain the stability 
of the world order. Indonesia sees UNPKO as a way to maintain the stability, 
particularly in areas of the world which armed conflicts are already started.” 
• MD: “International peace means international, not regional. One conflict in a far-away 
place, for example Africa, can spread and directly or indirectly affect other parts of the 
world, even to Indonesia. That is why it is necessary to contain armed conflicts. For 
Indonesia, UNPKO is currently the effective way to contain conflicts and maintain 
stability. For example, UNIFIL maintains stability of the relationship between 
Lebanon and Israel and MINUSTAH maintains stability between the rebel group and 
the government. 
 
2. In what ways Indonesia contribute to the maintenance of international peace? 
• MD: “We can classify the contribution into UNPKO and non-UNPKO. Within 
UNPKO, Indonesia contribute by supporting the UN system of peacekeeping and at 
the same time build cooperation with fellow peacekeepers from other countries by 
sharing best practices. Also, [by contributing through UNPKO participation] 
Indonesia can start peace and security cooperation with host country, for example by 
helping the national police of the host country to provide internal security. Outside 
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UNPKO, Indonesia is active in regional cooperation under ASEAN (through ASEAN 
Regional Forum) and the ad-hoc IMT in the Southern Philippines.” 
• MFA: “The main focus is through international organizations, and UNPKO is the 
biggest. Besides, Indonesia also actively get involved in conflict management 
bilaterally. It does not necessarily have to be armed conflict. For instance, a few years 
ago when Iran and Arab Saudi experienced conflict, Indonesia sent its Foreign Affairs 
Minister to offer mediation between them. Indonesia was one of the first countries 
offering the help. This is to show the world that Indonesia wants to be seen as a helpful 
country in conflict management, does not matter whether the conflict is near of far 
geographically.” 
 
3. What does participation in UNPKO mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy? 
• MFA: “Seeing it through the political lens, we see that this participation as a political 
statement from Indonesia as a middle power. We are proud of the status as middle 
power because it means that our identity is ‘leveled-up’ from the rest of the developing 
countries, and we are maintaining it. We are now conducting middle power diplomacy. 
Please take a look at legal documents on our participation in UNPKO, it is openly 
mentioned there. More participation means more legitimacy to hold onto that status.” 
 
4. What advantages does Indonesia gain from being in the top-ten rank of troop-
contributing states? 
• MFA: “First, image-wise, the participation is proven good to increase status and good 
image as a helpful country in conflict management and peacekeeping. Second, 
economy-wise, the peacekeepers gains [US] dollars from participating, which is good 
for his/her individual and family wealth. Also for the small firms that provides parts 
for military equipment and weaponry, because when you deploy troops, you provide 
the equipment by yourself. Third, military-wise, [the participation is] good for building 
a strong and positive military image that Indonesian military has good performance; 
and the peacekeepers get international military experience which is good for his/her 
career.” 
• MFA: “Aside from that, economically, the participation might have something else 
for Indonesia. It’s a ‘might’ because it depends on how we look at it. By using our own 
military equipment and weaponry, we can at the same time use our peacekeepers as a 
marketer to ‘advertise’ those. Indonesia promotes its equipment and weaponry to other 
troop-contributing countries. In the promotion we try to convince them that not only 
Indonesia’s equipment and weaponry are UN-standard products, but also that it is 
better if they buy Indonesia’s products in ‘friendly’ price instead of keep renting 
equipment and weaponry from developed countries. Most of the troop-contributors 
rent their equipment and weaponry from developed countries, such as the UK. 
However Indonesia has not gained anything yet from this promotion.” 
• MFA: “It enhances Indonesia’s role in international organizations. Indonesia is now 
in the top-ten rank [of troop-contributing countries]. Later if Indonesia managed to be 
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in the top-five, Indonesia will be automatically a member of UNPBC. No candidacy, 
no election needed. Also, it is a good campaign tool for Indonesia’s candidacy in the 
UNSC.” 
 
5. How does Indonesia perceive possible disadvantages of sending its troops to UNPKO 
(damage on national reputation)? 
• MD: “Indonesia’s peacekeepers are known for its good performance. There are indeed 
a small number of problematic peacekeepers, but we handle it quickly. The way we 
handle our problematic peacekeepers is respected by the UN. Indonesia also has a 
preventive act by including culture and moral lessons in the pre-deployment training 
program.” 
• MFA: “Indonesia is involved in the High-Level Meeting of Violence Act last 
September, you better check it later, because in the Meeting, one of the discussions 
was violence by peacekeepers. This act of Indonesia shows a serious commitment in 
handling problematic peacekeepers.  
There is actually another possible disadvantage which is more significant for 
Indonesia: the standby period. Because of the reduced financial contribution from the 
USA, now the UNPKO has a ‘standby mechanism’ in which peacekeepers who are 
ready to be deployed after the pre-deployment training cannot be directly send to their 
missions. The UN deploys peacekeepers when it is financially ready. Hence there is 
now a gap between after-training time and deploying time, called the standby period. 
In this period, the peacekeepers are ‘stranded’ in IPSC, waiting to be called by the 
UNPKO. It can take months, and during that period, Indonesia must finance their 
living costs—and sometimes transportation costs when they wait too long and need to 
go back to their units because the units need more personnel; and these costs are not 
reimbursed by the UN. We keep increase the participation anyways, because the 
political benefits gained is far more valuable than the costs Indonesia has to pay.” 
[Interviewee shows me a file, which I cannot share publicly, that shows the amount of 
costs Indonesia must face—bigger than the financial advantages gain.] 
 
6. How do you relate Indonesia’s participation in UNPKO with its candidacy as a non-
permanent member of UNSC? 
• MFA: “Indonesia is currently running for a candidacy as non-permanent member of 
the UNSC. This is the priority candidacy for Indonesia right now. Active participation 
in UNPKO increases Indonesia’s chance to win the election, because it shows 
Indonesia’s credibility to the maintenance of peace and security under the UN system. 
It is like we are saying to the UN member states that ‘we know our business, we know 
what we are doing, and we take it seriously. This will work, as it worked several years 
ago during Indonesia’s previous candidacy in the UNSC.” 
• MFA: “We are showing our commitment to the maintenance of peace by participating 
more and more to the UNPKO. The UNSC, as well as the UN member states, can see 
that Indonesia’s participation are not only great in terms of number but also quality, 
because some of our peacekeepers have strategic military positions in their missions. 
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By proving this commitment, Indonesia promotes itself to be the non-permanent 
member of the UNSC. And when Indonesia wins, it will be very beneficial because 
our voice in international security affairs will be more relevant.” 
 
 
7. What does Indonesia think of the reform of UNPKO? 
• MFA: “The robust mandate of not only protecting but also attacking is tricky for 
Indonesia. Ideologically, Indonesia refuses to attack a group only because of 
instruction from the head of mission. In the end, it is Indonesian peacekeepers who 
perform the attack, despite of the blue helmet they are wearing. If someday the group 
ends up leading the conflicting country, it becomes a disadvantage for Indonesia 
because it can destroy the relationship between Indonesia and that country. It will be 
silly if Indonesia has problem in the future because of its current effort to maintain 
world order. This, however, does not make Indonesia withdraw its peacekeepers or 
stop sending them. Indonesia is now carefully considering the mandate of each mission 
before pledging its deployment, just to make sure that the mandate is not contradictive 
with our ideology.” 
 
8. Most of the top-ten troops contributing states are from the Third World, how does 
Indonesia accept that while on the other hand it tries to elevate its status as a big state 
which plays important role in regional and international politics? 
• MD: “It does not matter, especially considering the positive points we have discussed. 
Indonesia has a vision of deploying 4,000 peacekeepers in 2020, Indonesia needs to 
focus on that. Also, being known at the same status as Third World countries is not a 
problem, as long as Indonesia can be a good UN member states. No need to be ashamed 
or want to be different.” 
• MD: “This should not be a concern for Indonesia. Peacekeeping is a trendy and sexy 
issue externally and internally. Externally, it helps Indonesia increase its image as a 
good UN member, internally it is something that can be used for politicians to gain 
sympathy of Indonesian people. Also, the army is enthusiast on being deployed in 
UNPKO, not only because of the international experience they can gain but also the 
extra dollars they can get. 
 
9. Could you explain the decision-making process of Indonesian troop deployment in 
UNPKO? 
• MD: “After the UN announces the request for the member states to deploy troops in 
certain mission, the TKMPP will study the mandate of the mission and analyse the 
importance of Indonesia to participate in the mission. If the TKMPP reaches to a 
conclusion that Indonesia should participate, a recommendation will be submitted to 
the President. If the President approves TKMPP’s recommendation, he will sign a 
Presidential Decree for Indonesia to participate, so that the Defense Ministry, National 
Police and other relevant institutions can prepare the personnel and the pre-deployment 
training, the Finance Ministry prepares the budgeting (every cost is paid by Indonesia 
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first, the UN reimburses it later; except for the standby costs), and the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry announces Indonesia’s pledge to send its troop to the UN. The UN, under the 
UNPCRS mechanism, will continuously check the personnel’s readiness to be 
deployed. When everything is ready, Indonesia and UN sign an agreed MoU.” 
• MD: “You must note that member state cannot freely choose in which missions it 
wants to deploy troop. Everything depends on the requests from the UN. We can do 
informal lobby to get certain mission, but it does not always work, but Indonesia is 
fine with that as long as the mandate is in line with our Constitution.” 
 
10. How does the military institution feel on the decision to increase of Indonesia’s 
participation in UNPKO? 
• MD: “We fully-support the decision because this is beneficial for the army. At glance, 
you may think that the benefits the army gain is only felt individually, which is when 
the Indonesian peacekeepers gain international military experience and networking. 
But it’s more beyond that. By sending the peacekeepers, completed with Indonesia’s 
own equipment and weaponry, we can see and compare the ability of our army with 
the other troop-contributing states. We can also learn from them. The more personnel 
sent, the more Indonesia can learn. Also, the participation caused the establishment 
of IPSC, we could not be prouder of it because it is the largest one in South-East Asia, 
and peacekeepers from other states come to our training centre to train. In short, the 
participation is positive for Indonesia’s military development and to show the world 
that Indonesian military is professional. 
 
11. Why do you think participation in UNPKO is beneficial for each troop deployed? 
• MD: “Because at least the peacekeeper will get three individual benefits. First, extra 
income in USD. Second, invaluable international experience. Third, internal military 
rewards; after they finish their deployment, they gain points that is recorder by our 
Human Resources Division. The points will significantly help them to accelerate their 
careers, either simply getting promoted, being deployed again but with higher 
positions, or getting chosen to be Indonesian military attachés in some countries. 
 
 
*** 
